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Expert evidence plays a crucial role in civil and criminal litigation. Changes in
the rules concerning expert admissibility, following the Supreme Court’s Daubert
ruling, strengthened judicial review of the reliability and the validity of an expert’s
methods. Judges and scholars, however, have neglected the threshold question for
expert evidence: whether a person should be qualified as an expert in the first place.
Judges traditionally focus on credentials or experience when qualifying experts
without regard to whether those criteria are good proxies for true expertise. We argue
that credentials and experience are often poor proxies for proficiency. Qualification of
an expert presumes that the witness can perform in a particular domain with a
proficiency that non-experts cannot achieve, yet many experts cannot provide
empirical evidence that they do in fact perform at high levels of proficiency. To
demonstrate the importance of proficiency data, we collect and analyze two decades
of proficiency testing of latent fingerprint examiners. In this important domain, we
found surprisingly high rates of false positive identifications for the period 1995 to
2016. These data would qualify the claims of many fingerprint examiners regarding
their near infallibility, but unfortunately, judges do not seek out such information. We
survey the federal and state case law and show how judges typically accept expert
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credentials as a proxy for proficiency in lieu of direct proof of proficiency. Indeed,
judges often reject parties’ attempts to obtain and introduce at trial empirical data on
an expert’s actual proficiency. We argue that any expert who purports to give
falsifiable opinions can be subjected to proficiency testing and that proficiency testing
is the only objective means of assessing the accuracy and reliability of experts who rely
on subjective judgments to formulate their opinions (so-called “black-box experts”).
Judges should use proficiency data to make expert qualification decisions when the
data is available, should demand proof of proficiency before qualifying black-box
experts, and should admit at trial proficiency data for any qualified expert. We seek
to revitalize the standard for qualifying experts: expertise should equal proficiency.
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INTRODUCTION
Expert witnesses appear in a vast number of cases every year.1 In civil
cases, experts often address questions central to liability and damages, and in
criminal cases, they address questions touching on both guilt and
punishment. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,2 and subsequent revisions to Federal Rule of Evidence 702
dealing with expert evidence,3 judges now have a much greater authority and
responsibility to inquire into the reliability and validity of expert’s methods.
The threshold question, however, is whether a person is “qualified” to be an
expert based on “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”4 To
answer this question, courts routinely accept a witness’s own self-serving
statements of expertise buoyed by educational credentials, professional
training, or experience, rarely spending much time on this threshold question
before moving on to examine the methods used and conclusions reached by
the putative expert.5 In this Article, we seek to revitalize the expert
qualification inquiry and encourage greater reflection on what should be
required of expert witnesses.
What does it mean to label someone an “expert”? From a social scientific
perspective, the label “expert” means something different than simply having
specialized education or experience. It is not a matter of credentials or work
history but rather a question of performance: “Expertise is defined as a sequence
of mastered challenges with increasing levels of difficulty in specific areas of
functioning.”6 Experts are those who are particularly proficient on a task or who
1 Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (finding experts in 86% of civil
trials sampled); Andrew W. Jurs, Expert Prevalence, Persuasion, and Price: What Trial Participants Really
Think About Experts, 91 IND. L.J. 353, 355 (2016) (“[T]he data reveals that expert witnesses appear in
86% of the cases in the study, which is an identical percentage as in two prior research studies.”).
2 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993) (holding that the trial judge must make “a preliminary assessment
of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid”).
3 FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring expert testimony to be based on “sufficient facts or data” and
the product of “reliable principles and methods”).
4 Id.
5 See infra Section II.A; see also DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., 5 MOD. SCI. EVID. § 43:2 (2016–2017
ed.) (summarizing that “courts typically are generous in finding that a proposed expert’s training or
experience satisfies Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or its state equivalent”).
6 Barry J. Zimmerman, Development and Adaptation of Expertise: The Role of Self-Regulatory
Processes and Beliefs, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE
705, 706 (2006) (citation omitted); accord Barbara A. Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 149, 152 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell
eds., 2010) (“Due to study, training, and practice—often in addition to talent and motivation—experts
are better than nonexperts in some domain of performance.”); David J. Weiss & James Shanteau,
Decloaking the Privileged Expert, 18 J. MGMT. & ORG. 300, 307 (2012) (“Rather than thinking
generically of people as experts, we prefer to say that a person has demonstrated expertise in a specific
set of tasks.”); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS
ON SCI. AND TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC
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are especially knowledgeable about a subject. The expert interpreter can
translate one language into another with a high degree of accuracy across
language samples that would remain inscrutable to non-experts. The expert
cytologist can differentiate cancerous cells from non-cancerous cells with a high
degree of accuracy and with a high degree of reliability when those samples are
submitted for retesting, while most non-experts examining the samples would
perform at levels no better than chance. An expert on American history can
answer questions on arcane historical topics with a degree of accuracy and
reliability far beyond that exhibited by the average person. Expertise may be
acquired in many different ways, but anyone who claims to be an expert
should be able to prove that expertise empirically through superior
performance within the domain of purported expertise.7 Ideally, assessments
of expertise make use of a performance measure that indisputably separates
good performance from bad. Where such a “gold standard” for good
performance exists,8 an expert can be subjected to what is commonly called
proficiency testing.9 In proficiency testing, the putative expert’s response on
a test can be objectively scored as correct or incorrect. Thus, a candidate to
become a court interpreter can be presented with a number of foreign phrases
whose English meanings are known and her interpretations can be evaluated
for their accuracy. Or a cytologist can be presented with cell samples known
to include cancerous and non-cancerous cells to assess how accurately the
cytologist distinguishes the two types of cells. Proficiency testing also permits
an assessment of an individual’s reliability, or consistency, in performance: to
what extent does the person give the same answers across like items and

VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 6 (Sept. 2016) [hereinafter PCAST Report]
(“Demonstrating that an expert is capable of reliably applying the method is crucial—especially for
subjective methods, in which human judgment plays a central role.”).
7 The Federal Rules of Evidence take a functionalist, relativistic approach to expertise: experts
are those who possess knowledge that will enable them to provide information that is not generally
known by non-expert laypersons. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“Whether the
situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting
the trier. ‘There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common
sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the
best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized
understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.’” (citation omitted)).
8 David J. Weiss & James Shanteau, Empirical Assessment of Expertise, 45 HUM. FACTORS 104, 104
(2003) (“The ideal is to correlate action with a gold standard, an unequivocally valid, universally accepted
outcome measure that directly reflects the behavior under scrutiny.”). When a gold standard of
performance does not exist, other benchmarks can be used to distinguish expert from non-expert
performance, but disagreements may arise with respect to the suitability of these other benchmarks.
9 See Jonathan J. Koehler, Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They Are and Why They
Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1091 (2008) (“A proficiency test is an assessment of the performance of
laboratory personnel using samples whose sources are known to the proficiency test administrator but
unknown to the examinee.”).
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different answers across different items?10 Increasingly difficult tests can be
used to identify those most expert at a task.
Unlike judges who focus on the experience or credentials of an expert,
social scientists who study experts emphasize performance over self-serving
statements and credentials because the latter are often unreliable guides to
true expertise. “Experts have often been identified by self-proclamation or
acclamation by other experts as well as by experience, titles, and degrees.
However, these methods can be misleading when searching for an expert.”11 In
some domains, governments require that persons and organizations claiming
to be experts on some task demonstrate that expertise empirically, through
performance on proficiency tests tailored to that task. Thus, persons seeking
to serve as court interpreters must pass proficiency tests designed to ensure
expertise in the languages to be interpreted,12 and clinical labs that screen
human samples for diagnostic testing must participate in regular proficiency
testing that produces results the public can examine and compare.13
In one large and important domain, however, neither federal nor state
governments require performance-based evidence of expertise: in order to
10 We focus in this Article on experts that provide conclusions based on analysis of facts in a
case. Experts may also testify about more general scientific research, in order to provide a
“framework” to educate factfinders, and they may explain industry or professional norms as well.
See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA.
L. REV. 559, 570 (1987) (defining the “social framework” as “the use of general conclusions from
social science research in determining factual issues in a specific case” (emphasis omitted) (footnote
omitted)). Such expertise can also be tested; the person’s knowledge of the relevant research and
standards can be assessed. However, it is particularly important that “black box” experts be tested,
since such experts claim to reach conclusions using methods that may be opaque.
Similarly, we do not focus in this Article on experts whose work is not a “black box,” but where
they perform a test that uses a scientific method, or even an automated method. There may be
questions whether a test to analyze material for whether it contains controlled substances is the
correct test, or whether the drug-testing machine was properly calibrated, but the method itself is
not a black box, so long as its processes are disclosed in litigation. See PCAST Report, supra note 6,
at 5 (distinguishing between objective methods, for which foundational validity can be studied by
measuring accuracy, and subjective methods, for which “black box” evaluation must be conducted).
When experts report the results of automated or machine methods, then the focus should be on the
validity and reliability of the machine, not the expert. See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE
L. J. 1972, 1979 (2017) (criticizing how testimony by human experts “might create a veneer of scrutiny
when in fact the actual source of the information, the machine, remains largely unscrutinized”).
11 Weiss & Shanteau, supra note 8, at 104.
12 For federal English–Spanish interpreter certification rules, which require both written and
oral examinations, see Federal Court Interpreter Certification Examination, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/federal-court-interpreters/federal-court-interpretercertification-examination [http://perma.cc/BE3X-LU74]; see also, e.g., FLORIDA RULES FOR
CERTIFICATION AND REGULATION OF SPOKEN LANGUAGE COURT INTERPRETERS 4-6,
http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/419/urlt/formatted-interpreter-rules-May-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJH4-5H7Q] (establishing multiple levels of expertise for court interpreters, with
increasing qualifications for each level).
13 42 U.S.C. § 263a(b) (2012). Section III.A describes these regulations in greater detail.
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qualify as an expert witness at trial, a person need only proclaim that she has
specialized knowledge or ability, obtained through education or experience,
that would enable her to supply relevant information that a non-expert
witness could not supply.14 The testimony that the expert hopes to give is
supposed to be the product of reliable methods applied to sufficient data, but
there is no requirement that the expert demonstrate her proficiency at giving
correct answers to the kinds of questions counsel will pose to her at trial.15
Take the example of fingerprint experts, who have testified in criminal
cases for over a hundred years.16 The latent fingerprint examiner uses some
objective criteria initially, when categorizing a print as having a “whorl” or a
“loop” pattern.17 However, the analysis that follows is “purely subjective,”
requiring an evaluation of details in a print and comparing it to details in
another print.18 Such a subjective method can be valid and reliable.19 But
based on what we currently know, fingerprint analysis has a “substantial” error
rate, making it especially important to assess how “expert” an individual
examiner is at fingerprint identifications.20 Yet, judges do not ask fingerprint
examiners to come forward with evidence that they can correctly match latent
prints to known prints with a high (or any) degree of proficiency. The
examiner seeking to testify need only describe training and familiarity with
the methods in the field to determine whether latent fingerprints from a
crime scene match the fingerprints taken from known individuals. Judges do
not inquire further even if she boasts that she has a zero or near-zero error
rate in fingerprint identifications. Under present practice, as we will describe,
both federal and state courts regularly accept proxies for expert performance
in lieu of actual performance data. Judges also deny opposing parties access
to proficiency testing data when it exists, despite unsupported claims by
experts regarding their supposed proficiency.21

14 Weiss and Shanteau label experts whose performance is not subjected to empirical scrutiny
“privileged experts,” and they include expert witnesses within this category. Weiss & Shanteau, supra
note 8, at 300-02.
15 See Section I.A for a description of how courts do not examine proficiency when deciding
whether to qualify experts.
16 PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 9 (“Latent fingerprint analysis was first proposed for use in
criminal identification in the 1800s and has been used for more than a century.”).
17 Id. at 89 n.253.
18 Id. at 9.
19 Id. (calling fingerprint analysis a “foundationally valid subjective methodology”).
20 Id.
21 See Section II.A for more on the trend of judicial disregard for proficiency testing in
evaluating expert witnesses. For prominent criticism of such testimony in the fingerprint area, see
PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 87-103; and NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON
IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCES COMMUNITY, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 136-45 (National Academies
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This odd state of affairs—in which faith is placed in self-proclamations of
expertise and judges ignore the most probative evidence on expertise—cannot
be attributed to the lack of gold-standard measures of performance in the areas
in which experts seek to testify in court. An expert testifying in any area for
which there are better and worse ways of doing a task or correct and incorrect
answers to questions can be subjected to proficiency testing. These conditions
apply, for instance, to medical experts in civil cases and forensic experts in
criminal cases.22 In fact, some fields of expertise already engage in proficiency
testing, but only disappointingly few do so, and even fewer make their
proficiency data public or willingly share it in discovery. These fields usually
adopted proficiency testing when mandated to do so or as a part of an effort
to regulate quality within a field to dispel credibility concerns, as with the
move to proficiency testing by fingerprint examiner associations. Not only is
proficiency testing commonly not done in many fields, but what little is done
is often not sufficiently challenging or realistic in its design. A leading
commercial provider for forensic proficiency tests candidly explained: “Easy
tests are favored by the community.”23 Where an expert’s primary, or perhaps
only, market is the courtroom, as is the case with most forensic experts and a
variety of experts in civil litigation, the expert has little to gain and much to
lose from engaging voluntarily in proficiency testing. Absent a mandate from
courts or regulators, widespread proficiency testing is unlikely to occur.
Only recently has this proficiency problem begun to receive real attention.
Most notably, the White House Presidential Council for Advisers on Science
and Technology (PCAST) issued a report in September 2016 underscoring
the “essential” need for proficiency testing of forensic experts to assess “an
examiner’s capability and performance in making accurate judgments,” in a
manner that is realistic, routine, and under the supervision of a disinterested
third party.24 Unfortunately, as that report noted, in criminal cases, examiners
have long testified that they were infallible without having had their
proficiency rigorously assessed.25 Several scholars have highlighted how
Press 2009) [hereinafter NAS Report], identifying lack of documentation and high error rate in
fingerprint analysis as key problems for in-court evidentiary use.
22 Forensics involves the analysis of crime scene evidence to identify participants in a possible
crime and to determine the manner in which a crime may have been committed. See, e.g., NAS
Report, supra note 21, at 35-36.
23 PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 57 n.133 (quoting Christopher Czyryca, President,
Collaborative Testing Services, Inc.).
24 Id. at 102.
25 Id. at 3; see also Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint
Identifications, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1043, 1048 (2005) (pointing to individual
instances of courts accepting expert self-reporting of zero or near-zero error rates); Jonathan J.
Koehler, Forensics or Fauxrensics? Ascertaining Accuracy in the Forensic Sciences, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1369,
1371 (2017) (“Numerous forensic authorities and respected textbook authors encourage such
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existing proficiency testing suggests troubling error rates and that more
rigorous proficiency is needed.26 Few have suggested that proficiency should
be taken into account by judges. 27 In this Article, we describe how proficiency
should inform the legal standards for the qualification of experts and should
be at the core of evidence law’s understanding of expertise.
In Part I of this Article, we set out the standards for how courts currently
qualify experts and then we turn to a more detailed explanation of the concept
of proficiency. We propose a rethinking of the approach towards expert
qualification, making the case for performance-based assessments of
expertise. We proceed first with a more detailed discussion of proficiency
testing and its benefits. Second, we demonstrate the value of proficiency data
by consolidating all of the publicly available results of fingerprint examiner
proficiency testing from the past two decades. Our analysis reveals that,
contrary to common claims made by fingerprint experts in court and
elsewhere, the method of fingerprint examination is far from error free. Error
rates ranged from 1-2% to 10-20% per test administration with respect to false
positives (i.e., erroneous linking of a latent print to an individual’s known
print) in proficiency tests from 1995 to 2016. We found an average 7% false
positive rate over this time period and an average 7% false negative (i.e.,
erroneous failure to link a latent print to an individual’s known print) rate.
Presentation of this data at trials might well have changed the outcome in
some cases by altering the jury or judge’s beliefs about the near infallibility
of fingerprint identifications.28

hyperbole” and citing sources). The earlier 2009 NRC Report also highlighted the need for “routine,
mandatory proficiency testing that emulates a realistic, representative cross-section of casework.”
NAS Report, supra note 21, at 25.
26 See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV.
45, 80 (1993) (“The proficiency test results of many common laboratory examinations are
disturbing.”); Koehler, supra note 9, at 1077 (“Critics charge that fingerprint analysis lacks an empirical
foundation and that examiners make exaggerated claims that are likely to mislead jurors.”); Koehler,
supra note 25, at 1369 (“Unless and until such [proficiency testing] studies are undertaken, legal
decision makers will continue to fly blind when it comes to assessing the reliability of a reported
forensic match.”); Seventh Circuit Upholds the Reliability of Expert Testimony Regarding the Source of a
Latent Fingerprint—United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 2349,
2356 (2002) (recommending “generation and administration” of [] proficiency tests”); see also Barack
Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 862 (2017)
(calling for ongoing work to strengthen forensic science).
27 Gary Edmond, Forensic Science Evidence and the Conditions for Rational (Jury) Evaluation, 39 MELB.
U. L. REV. 77, 85-86 (2015) (“[R]egardless of qualifications and experience, rigorous proficiency testing
tells us whether the forensic analyst performs a task or set of tasks better than non-experts or chance. A
significantly enhanced level of performance is precisely what it means to be an expert.”).
28 In a work in progress, we find that presentation of proficiency data does impact the weight
that lay jurors attach to forensic evidence. Greg Mitchell & Brandon Garrett, The Impact of Proficiency
Testing Information on the Weight Given to Fingerprint Evidence (work in progress) (on file with authors).
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The fingerprint examiner proficiency data highlight a particular point in
favor of mandatory proficiency testing: fingerprint examiners, like many
other experts, rely on subjective judgment to formulate their opinions.29 An
expert who uses a wholly objective method to formulate an opinion can be
shown to have erred by showing that proper use of the method does not in
fact yield the result the expert claims. In contrast, whenever an expert’s
method involves subjective judgment, even in part, then the only means for
testing the accuracy and reliability of the expert’s method is through
proficiency testing.30 An expert who uses a subjective method is a “black box”
into which data is fed and out of which magically pops an answer. Such an
expert can never be shown definitively to have erred in applying a method
because that method cannot be observed and applied by others. However, if
proficiency data for such “black-box experts” exists, then we can assess their
basic levels of proficiency, which provides important information about their
ability to provide accurate and reliable information. Experts reaching
conclusions using subjective methods may be highly reliable. But walking
through the courtroom door is unlikely to transform an “expert” who
regularly receives low scores on proficiency tests into a highly reliable source
of information in the case at hand.
Excellence on proficiency tests does not guarantee accuracy at trial, but
the opinions of the less proficient witness are, in general, more likely to be
wrong. Thus, many medical residents know, in theory, how to read an X-ray
to find the problems discussed in textbooks and could serve as expert
witnesses under prevailing law, but that knowledge alone does not ensure
expert performance at reading X-rays. Experts should be qualified based on
empirical evidence of their proficiency before addressing whether their
methods used and conclusions reached are valid and reliable.
In Part II, we use the contrast between claimed and actual expertise to
criticize courts’ reluctance to require proficiency testing, permit discovery of
proficiency data, or admit proficiency data at trial. After reviewing the case
law on proficiency data, we side with courts that recognize the value of
29 See PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 58 (“Proficiency testing is especially critical for
subjective methods: because the procedure is not based solely on objective criteria but relies on
human judgment, it is inherently vulnerable to error and inter-examiner variability.”).
30 Id. Where objective evidence of innocence becomes available after trial (e.g., through DNA
testing in rape cases), it is possible to determine, after the fact, whether an expert using subjective
judgment erred. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (exploring “the forensic science testimony by prosecution
experts in the trials of innocent persons, all convicted of serious crimes, who were later exonerated by
post-conviction DNA testing”). Of course, this method can only be used in a relatively small number of
cases and provides no protection against unreliable experts before the fact. Id. at 7-8 (noting that the data
set is “unrepresentative of typical criminal cases,” and the study does not examine whether “an examiner
made a mistake or engaged in misconduct in the laboratory”).
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proficiency data and recognize that existing rules for expert evidence and
discovery can accommodate demands for proficiency data. We argue that
there is no good justification for continuing to qualify experts based on poor
proxies for proficiency, like credentials or experience, when proficiency
testing is possible or proficiency data already exists. In areas in which
proficiency testing is voluntary, one might argue allowing discovery of
proficiency data could deter voluntary testing, but this concern disappears in
a world in which proficiency testing is made mandatory or it is strongly
preferred. We also explain how our approach would buttress reliability
analyses under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and would produce
important evidence for a jury’s consideration. Proficiency data provides an
objective basis for excluding the opinions of any expert with unacceptably low
proficiency and for assessing the weight of expert evidence.
In Part III, we describe a regulatory approach towards assuring
proficiency of experts using realistic blind proficiency testing, which could
help ensure that disciplines have adequate proficiency data to present in
court. A federal agency could regulate proficiency more broadly, as leading
scientific groups have proposed, and as is currently done for clinical
laboratories, and in other countries.
A proficiency-based approach to expert qualification would improve the
quality of evidence at trial, and it would simplify judicial gatekeeping of
expert evidence. Judges should adopt the view that expertise equals
proficiency, or legislatures should impose that view on courts.
I. TRUE EXPERTISE = PROFICIENCY
A. Judicial Qualification of Experts Using Education and Experience
The Supreme Court’s most prominent ruling on expert evidence, Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, prescribes how judges should determine
whether the opinions an expert plans to offer are sufficiently reliable to
provide helpful knowledge.31 That analysis focuses on the validity and
reliability of the methods that the expert uses. That inquiry is important; if
the method as a whole is invalid and error-prone, then no matter how
accomplished the particular expert is at the method, the evidence should not
be admitted in court. Our focus here, however, is not on the question of the
validity and reliability of an entire method. Our focus is on the neglected but
logically prior question of how to decide who qualifies as an expert.32 When
31
32

509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993).
Similarly, two decisions of the Court that built on the Daubert decision failed to address this
question. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997).

2018]

The Proficiency of Experts

911

a party proposes that a witness be allowed to testify as an expert, the trial
judge must first determine whether that witness is in fact an expert. Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 defines an expert as one who is qualified “by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education” to give testimony that “will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”33 The
Supreme Court has not interpreted this language, and therefore, the primary
guidance for making the qualification decision comes from the text of Rule
702, advisory notes to the rule, and lower court interpretations of the rule.
The text of Rule 702 does not specify what comprises adequate
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” but the advisory notes
emphasize that “experience alone” may be sufficient as a foundation for expert
testimony and that experience is “the predominant, if not sole, basis for a
great deal of reliable expert testimony” in some fields.34 Lower courts, when
they do occasionally comment on the qualification question, likewise
emphasize that expertise can come from education or experience and that no
special credentials are required.35 In practice, courts often require little more
than a statement from the expert that she has developed specialized
knowledge in the domain in which she seeks to testify. Accordingly, expert
qualification typically involves a recitation of the formal education, training,
experience, and achievements that the putative expert has in a field, along
with a statement of familiarity with the body of knowledge needed to
formulate an opinion that may be helpful in the case.36 Most of the work in
ensuring the helpfulness of expert evidence consists in a review of the

33 FED. R. EVID. 702. State rules of evidence typically contain similar qualification language.
E.g., TENN. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will substantially
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.”); W. VA. R. EVID. 702(a) (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).
34 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
35 See, e.g., Tuf Racing Products, Inc. v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 223 F.3d 585, 591, 54
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1492 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The notion that [Daubert] requires particular credentials
for an expert witness is radically unsound.” (citation omitted)).
36 See, e.g., Warren Eginton, A View from the Bench—The Expert in the Courtroom, 3 PROD.
LIAB. L.J. 114, 117 (1992) (stating “the curriculum vitae of the expert will be most important” to
impress jurors). Some jury studies suggest that jurors place at least some weight on credentials,
although it may vary based on the type of case and the presentation of the testimony. See Sanja
Kutnjak Ivković & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations Of Expert Testimony: Judging The Messenger
And The Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 458-64 (2003) (discussing how jurors consider an
expert’s credentials).
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sufficiency of the data considered by the expert and the reliability of the
methods used and conclusions reached.37
Yet as we will see, for a large class of experts—those who rely in part or in
whole on subjective or intuitive judgments to form their opinions—there exist
no objective standards for evaluating the sufficiency of the data they considered
or the reliability of their “black-box” method. For these experts, the qualification
decision effectively becomes the reliability review. But credentials such as
number of times previously testifying, number or type of degrees, years of
experience, or membership in professional organizations—the very kind of
information that judges look to in making the qualification decision—are poor
indicators of whether these persons truly do have the ability to do what they
claim to be expert at doing.38
One response to the problem of expert qualification is to suggest that Rule
702 should be revised, to focus in its text and in its Advisory Notes on
empirical assessment of proficiency. We would support doing so, and in fact,
the Advisory Committee is soliciting input on Rule 702 prompted by
concerns raised about the reliability of expert evidence often admitted,
particularly in criminal cases.39
However, another way to view the problem of expert qualification is that
courts have not interpreted Rule 702 correctly. The text of Rule 702 does not
specify what comprises adequate “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education,” and, while the Advisory Notes emphasize that “experience alone”
may be sufficient,40 the rule clearly contemplates that the witness will have
uncommon knowledge and an ability to use that knowledge expertly. In other
words, before a court reaches the question of whether an expert’s opinions in
the courtroom are reliable, the rule contemplates that the proffered witness
is capable of expert performance outside the courtroom on the kinds of
questions the expert will be asked to answer in the courtroom. This expertise
inquiry could be much simpler and more accurate if courts did not settle for
credentials and self-proclamations of expertise.
37 This is at least true in those jurisdictions that follow Daubert. See, e.g., United States v.
Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he unremarkable observation that an expert may be
qualified by experience does not mean that experience, standing alone, is a sufficient foundation
rendering reliable any conceivable opinion the expert may express.”).
38 For an article making a similar observation about the standards for expert admissibility in
Australia, see Edmond, supra note 27, at 98 (“Conventional admissibility criteria and heuristics—such
as formal qualifications, a ‘field’, ‘training, study or experience’, prior legal recognition and
admission—do not provide direct insight into validity, error rates and limitations, or proficiency.”).
39 Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Spring 2017 Meeting 2 (Apr. 21, 2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/advisory_committee_on_rules_of_evidence__spring_2017_meeting_materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/463P-UZBX] (describing a planned conference
for October 2017 to discuss whether changes are necessary to Rule 702 due to concerns with its use,
particularly in criminal cases).
40 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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So, rather than interpret Rule 702 to endorse a liberal test of expert
qualification that leaves critical scrutiny to the reliability review, an
alternative interpretation that is consistent with the text and advisory note,
and that has more merit from a functional perspective, is that Rule 702 cares
more about expertise per se than about any particular route to expertise.
Hence, the rule’s refusal to endorse any particular expert requirements does
not mean that having specialized education or experience is sufficient. Rather,
what matters is being able to use that specialized knowledge in a way that
could be helpful to the case. Under this performance-based interpretation,
what matters is whether one has demonstrable expertise. To make this
determination, information about credentials and experience can be helpful,
but this information will always be only indirect evidence that an individual
has true expertise that may be useful to the case. For any type of expert, direct
evidence of expertise can be obtained.
Some experts serve only to “educate the factfinder about general
principles,” without reaching conclusions that attempt to “apply these
principles to the specific facts of the case.”41 Proficiency can be tested even for
experts who only testify about general information that may have some bearing
on the case. For the expert describing background research, direct evidence of
expertise would consist of proof that the individual is in fact familiar with the
relevant literature that he or she seeks to summarize or translate for the jury.
Courts are usually content to rely on indirect evidence of expertise to qualify
such an expert, and leave direct attacks on expertise to cross-examination. That
approach is defensible under Rule 702, at least where indirect evidence of
expertise exists and we have reason to believe it is a good proxy for expertise.42
But direct evidence of expertise can be obtained for the expert who just serves
as a lecturer to the jury on some topic through the use of proficiency tests that
assess the expert’s familiarity with the relevant literature.
We should therefore see Rule 702 as imposing three basic requirements
on putative expert witnesses: (a) proper tools, (b) proper data, and (c) true
expertise. An ax is an excellent tool for chopping wood, but it is a terrible
tool for cutting paper, and many people are not expert at using an ax for any
purpose. Under Rule 702, it is not enough to know what tool should be used
to analyze data to generate an answer for the case; the expert should also be
required to show that she is proficient at using the tool to analyze data and
41 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments. The Advisory Committee
Notes explain that for such “generalized testimony,” the court should assure that the expert is qualified,
expert testimony would assist the jury, the testimony is “reliable,” and the testimony fits the facts of the
case. Id. We submit that the qualification of such an expert should be objectively assessed.
42 Though presumably the expert’s lack of familiarity with the relevant literature might in
some cases be so poor that the judge would treat this as a disqualification rather than a matter going
to weight of the testimony.
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produce correct answers. Education and experience will enable many people
to claim expertise, but true expertise implies proficiency in performance.
A particular advantage of this alternative interpretation of Rule 702’s
qualification requirement is that it complements Rule 702’s reliability
requirement. For many non-scientific experts for whom the Daubert factors
can be difficult to adapt (because there is often no research into the reliability
of the methods used by experts in these domains and no journals are devoted
to developing reliable knowledge within these domains), and for black-box
experts whose methods cannot be directly observed for reliability, a
proficiency approach to expert qualification ensures a minimal level of
reliability in an expert’s opinions. An expert who cannot perform significantly
better than chance, or who can barely outperform non-experts on a
proficiency test, is an unreliable source of information for a case. With a
proficiency-based approach to qualification, courts effectively conduct an
individualized reliability analysis for each expert. Just as a poor method
should fail reliability scrutiny under Rule 702, an inexpert “expert” should fail
qualification scrutiny under Rule 702.
B. Identifying Experts Through Performance
In contrast to the traditional view of judges that having certain education,
training, or experience qualifies one as an expert, among those who study experts,
expertise is synonymous with performance at consistently high levels. “Experts
stand out because of their superior performance and unique capabilities.”43 Much
debate exists among psychologists about the origins of expertise,44 but little
debate exists regarding the need to use performance-based measures to identify
experts. Alternative measures, such as reputation or years of experience, pose a
risk of misidentification: “[T]here is a clear lack of association between length of
experience and performance, and between perceived expertise and performance.”45
Therefore, where objective measures of good performance are available,
43 David Z. Hambrick & Robert R. Hoffman, Expertise: A Second Look, IEEE INTELLIGENT
SYSTEMS, July–Aug. 2016, at 50, 54.
44 Broadly, the debate comes down to the relative contributions of deliberate practice versus
innate talent. See generally David Z. Hambrick, Brooke N. Macnamara, Guillermo Campitelli,
Fredrik Ullén & Miriam A. Mosing, Beyond Born Versus Made: A New Look at Expertise, 64 PSYCHOL.
LEARNING & MOTIVATION 1 (2016). Our argument does not depend on our taking a side in this
origins-of-expertise debate.
45 K. Anders Ericsson, Expertise and Individual Differences: The Search for the Structure and
Acquisition of Experts’ Superior Performance, WILEY INTERDISC. REVS. COGN. SCI., Jan.–Apr. 2017,
at 1, 2; cf. James Shanteau, David J. Weiss, Rickey P. Thomas & Julia Pounds, How Can You Tell If
Someone Is an Expert? Performance-Based Assessment of Expertise, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON
JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 620, 622-24 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau, eds.,
2003) (discussing the limitations of using experience, accreditation, and peer identification as the
basis for identifying experts).
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researchers prefer those measures to status symbols that signal specialized
education or experience but can be poor proxies for expert performance.
Where clear benchmarks of superior performance exist, tests can be
developed to identify high and low performers for purposes of training and
quality control.46 Such tests, which are now commonly called proficiency
tests, can be used to monitor not only the performance of human workers but
also the performance of machines and materials being used in production. In
fact, proficiency testing had its origin in materials testing:
[P]roficiency testing had its probable beginnings in the paleolithic [sic] age,
for it can be logically assumed that Neanderthal man tested his lethal stone
axes for strength, weight, and serviceability before using them for the
onslaught of his enemies. In more modern times, and especially during the
formative period of our country, the value of proficiency testing and quality
assurance became essential for the development of our railroads and
industrial corporations.47

The use of proficiency testing to monitor human performance became
prominent after World War II, when a consortium of medical laboratories
began circulating specimen samples to laboratories to determine their accuracy
in identifying the specimens.48 The impetus for the survey was the discovery
of a surprising number of errors by laboratories in an experiment conducted in
1945 to assess the level of agreement across medical laboratories within
Pennsylvania.49 After viewing the results, the College of American Pathologists
“recognized that, to maintain high standards, the accuracy of measurements
must be under constant professional surveillance . . . . Accordingly, continuous
professional assessment, or proficiency testing, eventually became accepted
as the reasonable foundation upon which high standards of laboratory work
46 “[Proficiency] tests can serve many purposes including but not limited to training and testing
personnel, improving laboratory practices and procedures, and identifying future needs for a laboratory.
Properly designed, proficiency tests may also provide a reasonable estimate of the rate at which false
discoveries, false positive errors, and false negative errors occur.” Koehler, supra note 9, at 1091 (footnote
omitted). International scientific organizations define proficiency testing as “an evaluation of
participant performance against pre-established criteria by means of interlaboratory comparisons.”
NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION REGARDING PROFICIENCY
TESTING IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 7, (Mar. 22, 2016).
47 F. William Sunderman, Sr., The History of Proficiency Testing/Quality Control, 38 CLINICAL
CHEMISTRY 1205, 1205 (1992). This program eventually became formalized as the Sunderman
Proficiency Test Service, which the American Society of Clinical Pathology took over in 1985 and
continues to run. See id. at 1207; AM. SOC’Y FOR CLINICAL PATHOLOGY, U.S. (ONLY) PROCEDURES
FOR EXAMINATION & CERTIFICATION (2017), https://www.ascp.org/content/docs/default-source/
boc-pdfs/exam-content-outlines/ascp-boc-us-procedures-book-web.pdf?sfvrsn=2
[https://perma.cc/ZKE2-LXE2].
48 Sunderman, Sr., supra note 47, at 1206.
49 Id.
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might be maintained.”50 Eventually, the federal Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Act (CLIA), passed in 1967, mandated proficiency testing for
various medical laboratories.51
Recognizing the value of proficiency testing as a means of quality
assurance, many industries and organizations have instituted proficiency
testing programs without being compelled to do so by law. The particular uses
of proficiency testing results vary, but the primary uses include monitoring
the performance of laboratories over time and in comparison to one another,
and monitoring the performance of individuals as part of their training and
as a means of ongoing quality assurance.52
In the area of forensic science, all accredited crime laboratories must
conduct proficiency testing annually across the different disciplines that they
employ, whether it is DNA testing, fingerprint testing, ballistics, toolmark
identification, or some other discipline.53 In 1974, a federal grant to the
Forensic Sciences Foundation (FSF) funded administration of twenty-one
proficiency tests at crime laboratories around the country.54 The results were
not heartening; FSF uncovered “serious problems” in several disciplines,
leading to recommendations for improved quality assurance.55 In 1979,
forensic practitioners voted against a proposal to create a system of peer
review through training, certification and proficiency testing for all types of
forensics.56 FSF continued to conduct proficiency tests through the early
50
51

Id. at 1206-07.
42 U.S.C. § 263a (2012) (applying to all clinical laboratories, defined as “a facility for the
biological, microbiological, serological, chemical, immuno-hematological, hematological,
biophysical, cytological, pathological, or other examination of materials derived from the human
body for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any
disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings”). An amendment in
1988 extended the reach of CLIA. See, e.g., Proficiency Testing, Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2014).
52 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Coming to Grips with Scientific Research in Daubert’s “Brave New
World”: The Courts’ Need to Appreciate the Evidentiary Differences Between Validity and Proficiency Studies,
61 BROOK. L. REV. 1247, 1254-56 (1995) (“[I]n a proficiency study the object of the test is a particular
analyst or laboratory.”); see also Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1212-13 (2004)
(discussing the distinction between proficiency tests and validation studies).
53 See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
54 Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing
Results, 1978–1991, I: Identification and Classification of Physical Evidence, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI.
994, 994 (1995).
55 Id. at 994-95.
56 See David D. Dixon, Note, The Admissibility of Electrophoretic Methods of Genetic Marker
Bloodstain Typing Under the Frye Standard, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 773, 809-10 (1986) (noting the
“proposal was resoundingly rejected by crime lab personnel”). It was, and remains, rare for results
of proficiency tests to be published in an academic setting. Id. at 813 (explaining that the goal of
achieving proficient experts is better accomplished by providing for confidential retraining and
retesting of the examiner rather than a public pronouncement that he or she has erred).
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1990s, when its operations were folded into the Collaborative Testing Services
(CTS), a company that conducts quality assurance work through the regular
administration of proficiency tests and other measures. In 1994, federal
legislation called for an advisory board to “specify criteria for quality
assurance and proficiency tests to be applied to the various types of DNA
analysis used by forensic laboratories.”57 That legislation has expired.
Since the 1990s, CTS has conducted proficiency testing across the forensic
disciplines. Demand has increased now that accrediting bodies require it, and
CTS has become a leading provider of proficiency tests.58 CTS makes
available on its website the results of its proficiency tests, and each year in
each discipline the reports show that errors are made.59 However, CTS has
stated that its reports should not be used to infer any “error rate” in any given
discipline, because the “design of an error rate study would differ considerably
from the design of a proficiency test.”60 In fact, an error rate study might well
reveal higher levels of error, for CTS does not claim that its proficiency tests
simulate realistic crime-scene samples, and nor can it control test taking
conditions, therefore participants know that they are being tested, and may
consult with others during the tests.61
For objective methods, accuracy and reliability can be assessed by
“measuring the accuracy, reproducibility, and consistency of each of its
individual steps.”62 Thus, a DNA test that relies on equipment to identify the
genetic markers in a sample may not require any subjective judgment, and
the quality of the method can be assured by seeing that the equipment uses
57
58

42 U.S.C. § 14131(a)(C)(3) (2012).
See Michael D. Risinger, Cases Involving the Reliability of Handwriting Identification Expertise
Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REV. 477, 484 (2007) (“The ASCLD-LAB standards
require proficiency testing as a condition of accreditation, and the CTS tests are an approved
provider (possibly the only one for Document Examination) of such tests. This has resulted in a
large increase in the number of tests ordered and returned.” (footnote omitted)).
59 See Reports, COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., INC., http://www.ctsforensics.com/reports/
default.aspx?F_CategoryId=19 [https://perma.cc/Q374-EF4B] (providing access to proficiency test
summary reports for the forensic disciplines).
60 COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., INC., CTS STATEMENT ON THE USE OF
PROFICIENCY TESTING DATA FOR ERROR RATE DETERMINATIONS 3 (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://www.ctsforensics.com/assets/news/CTSErrorRateStatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM5PBVJT] (“[T]he results found in CTS’ Summary Reports should not be used to determine forensic
science discipline error rates.”).
61 See Cole, supra note 25, at 1029 (“First, there are design flaws in the tests themselves. The
tests were conducted by mail under unproctored, untimed conditions. It is not known whether the
tests were completed by individual examiners or ‘by committee.’ Second, no metric exists for
measuring the degree of difficulty of the latent print comparison.” (footnote omitted)); Koehler,
supra note 9, at 1091 (“Collaborative Testing Services (CTS) offers hundreds of laboratories the
opportunity to participate in two fingerprint proficiency tests each year. Test participation is
voluntary, examinees know that they are participating in a test, and it is not clear whether examinees
work by themselves, in groups, or with assistance from supervisors.” (footnotes omitted)).
62 PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 5.
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scientifically sound design and is functioning properly and that human
sources of error from confusing samples or the like are minimized by
following standardized operational protocols.63
Many forensic methods involve a mix of both objective and subjective
analysis. For example, while a simple DNA test may be largely objective, a
DNA test in which the results may contain genetic markers from more than
one individual may require some considerable “subjective choices” by the
analysis.64 When a technique involves subjective decisions, then part of the
method is a “black box,” based on the experience and judgment of the person.
That subjective decisionmaking can be tested for its reliability and accuracy,
but only by using a proficiency test.
How is proficiency measured? In many domains, such as sporting events
and chess competitions, it is possible to identify consensual objective measures
of good performance.65 Where it is difficult to evaluate the quality of
performance in situ because an outcome may be ambiguous or factors beyond
the expert’s performance may contribute to the outcome, it is possible to
develop tests that simulate in-the-field conditions but can provide objective
feedback on performance. For example, cytologists can be asked to judge
whether cells from biopsies exhibit evidence of cancerous malformation using
cells from samples where it has been determined through other means that
cancer was or was not present. Or chemists and their drug-testing machinery
can be given samples of materials to test for the presence of narcotics using
samples of known chemical origins. Likewise, fingerprint and DNA analysts
can be presented with samples from known persons to test whether the
analysts properly match samples from the same persons. The consistency in a
person’s judgments can also be measured by including multiple samples from
the same sources; it is not uncommon for analysts to provide difference
judgments about two samples drawn from the same source.66

63
64
65

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Or one may use multiple objective measures of good performance and look for convergence
across measures to dispel debates about the best measure. For instance, various measures of patient
care could be combined to identify physicians who perform at the highest levels.
66 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Noise: How to Overcome the High, Hidden Cost of
Inconsistent Decision Making, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/noise
[https://perma.cc/EEP8-UCYE] (“The prevalence of noise has been demonstrated in several
studies. Academic researchers have repeatedly confirmed that professionals often contradict their
own prior judgments when given the same data on different occasions. For instance, when
software developers were asked on two separate days to estimate the completion time for a given
task, the hours they projected differed by 71%, on average. When pathologists made two
assessments of the severity of biopsy results, the correlation between their ratings was only .61
(out of a perfect 1.0), indicating that they made inconsistent diagnoses quite frequently.”).

2018]

The Proficiency of Experts

919

To be sure, in some domains, it can be more difficult to identify
uncontroversial objective measures of expert performance. One might
propose rates of reversal as a measure of judicial expertise, for example, but
good arguments can be made against that and any other supposed objective
measure of judicial expertise.67 In many fields, consensus exists regarding the
best methods for doing something and the best answers to questions, but
proficiency testing can still be used when no such consensus exists.
If an expert contends that a method or body of knowledge exists that
should be consulted to provide opinions or conclusions relevant to the case,
then that method or body of knowledge should be capable of generating a
proficiency test. If not, that absence begs the question of how the expert can
contend that she has reached a trustworthy conclusion. That is not to say that
disagreement among experts renders testimony inadmissible, for there may
be disagreement on how to interpret data, the best method to use, or how best
to use a method, but expert witnesses do need to employ a method that aims
at providing right answers to questions that can have right and wrong
answers. Otherwise, the expert seeks to offer nothing more than her own
personal opinions or speculation on some matter.68
1. Results: False Positive, False Negative, and Inconclusive
The results reported in proficiency tests can take multiple forms. In many
of the proficiency tests of relevance to expert witness testimony, the question
is whether a putative expert can correctly categorize a test item. For instance,
on a ballistics proficiency test, a firearms expert might be presented with a
firearm and several bullet fragments and be asked to categorize each fragment
as (a) having been fired from the gun, (b) not having been fired from the gun,
or (c) incapable of categorization. True-positive responses identify those bullet
fragments that were in fact fired from the gun, and true-negative responses
correctly identify those fragments not fired from the gun. False-positive
responses erroneously categorize a fragment as being fired from the gun, and
false-negative responses erroneously categorize a fragment as not being fired
67 See generally Gregory Mitchell, Evaluating Judges, in T HE P SYCHOLOGY O F J UDICIAL
D ECISION M AKING 221 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds., 2010) (discussing the many
contested ways of judging judicial performance). In general, where evaluations of outcomes involve
opinions over socially or politically contested matters, then it will be difficult to develop
uncontroversial proficiency tests. However, few fields of expertise whose members attempt to testify
in court offer opinions on matters that cannot be subjected to uncontroversial proficiency testing.
68 There may be some very limited areas (e.g., aesthetic judgments or valuations of rare items)
in which an expert’s judgment is authoritative simply because it is the expert’s judgment, but usually
the achievement of expert status alone is not a sufficient basis for an opinion. See Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert.”).
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from the gun. Whether an incapable-of-categorization response is valid
depends on whether the fragment presents adequate data for categorization,
as judged by the field’s standards. Such proficiency tests can thus yield rates
for true positives, true negatives, false positives, false negatives, and
inconclusives. High numbers of inconclusive responses indicate that either a
method is not very discriminating (i.e., it has difficulty dealing with
ambiguous data) or that the test-taker has assumed a conservative stance to
avoid committing clear errors. In addition to data on accuracy, error rates and
conservatism, proficiency tests can be used to examine adherence to specified
procedures and a range of other skills apart from getting right or wrong
answers. However, hit rates (i.e., percentages of true positives and true
negatives) and error rates (i.e., percentages of false positives and false
negatives) most directly address expert proficiency on the task of interest.
Within the forensic domain, false positive rates raise special concerns
because such mistakes can divert attention from the true offender and lead to
wrongful convictions.69 False negatives should also be of substantial concern,
however, because they can lead to erroneous acquittals and contribute as well
to wrongful convictions.
Nor should inconclusive rates be ignored, for a high number of
inconclusives for test items that other experts correctly categorize reveals a
lower level of proficiency. Moreover, a bias towards calling potential
exculpatory evidence merely inconclusive could result in failing to clear
innocent persons (e.g., the bullet fragment recovered from a crime scene that
was not fired by the suspect’s gun may be erroneously labeled inconclusive).
Likewise, a bias towards calling potential inculpatory evidence inconclusive
could result in substantial evidence of guilt going undetected. As Professor
Simon Cole points out, an analyst could get a “perfect” score by calling all
test items inconclusive, unless inconclusive answers matter—what is needed
69 See JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL
TECHNIQUES 79 (1981) (comparing the validity of clinical studies purporting to predict violent
behavior, including false positive rates); Simon A. Cole, The Prevalence and Potential Causes of
Wrongful Conviction by Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 39, 57-60 (2006)
(discussing fingerprint misattribution cases, ten of which resulted in wrongful convictions, and
noting how “these misattribution cases are important for understanding the potential for wrongful
conviction by fingerprint because misattributions may be expected to cause wrongful convictions”);
Stephen D. Hart et al., A Note on Portraying the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 17 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 695, 697 (1993) (comparing the rates, and methods for measuring them, of false positives
in studies predicting whether an individual will be violent). On variation in the ways false positives
are reported, see Cole, supra note 25, at 1030 (“There are a number of different ways of reporting
false positives. Often the false positive rate has been reported as the number of participants who
committed at least one false positive divided by the total number of participants.”); William C.
Thompson, Subjective Interpretation, Laboratory Error and the Value of Forensic DNA Evidence: Three
Case Studies, 96 GENETICA 153, 155 (1995) (“The false positive rate of a test is most usefully stated
as the ratio of false positives to the sum of true positives and false positives.” (citation omitted)).
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is a signal detection analysis examining relative rates of discrimination (i.e.,
the level at which true positives and true negatives can be discerned).70
2. Nature of the Proficiency Study
Proficiency tests may be conducted with test-takers knowing that they are
taking a test or “blind,” with the laboratory or individual being tested not
knowing that a proficiency test is being conducted.71 Even if the test
resembles everyday casework (as it should to be of any value), when the
individuals know they are being tested they may do their work differently.
The lack of blind proficiency testing has been a subject of repeated
criticism over the years in a range of disciplines, particularly with respect to
the forensic fields that regularly supply expert witnesses in criminal cases.72
One group of scholars noted: “no laboratory of which we are aware regularly
conducts blind proficiency tests that are given in the stream of casework in a
pattern or impression discipline, or, for that matter, in any other forensic
discipline.”73 Even in the area of DNA testing, data from blind proficiency
tests is lacking.74 Jonathan Koehler points out that, despite recommendations

70 Cole, supra note 25, at 1031. This approach is commonly used in studies of eyewitness
accuracy. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT:
ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 83-85 (2014) (providing an overview of the use of
Receiver Operating Characteristics, a method from signal detection theory, to examine
discriminability and response bias for binary classification decisions, as applied in eyewitness
memory research).
71 An example of blind testing is found at the Transportation Safety Administration, which
places weapons and explosives inside luggage to determine whether TSA’s airport screeners detect
these objects. PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 58.
72 See Adina Schwartz, A Systematic Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and
Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2005) (noting CTS proficiency tests
“are likely to have understated day-to-day laboratory error rates because the testing was declared,
rather than blind”). But see Steve Gutowski, A Response To: A Systematic Challenge to the Reliability
and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, a Recently Published Article by Adiana
[sic] Schwartz, FORENSIC BULL., Winter 2005, at 22, 24 (“[P]roficiency tests probably overestimate
the error rate due to the irritation many examiners felt, at least in the past, of unnecessary testing
which stopped people from getting on with their ‘real work’. . . .”).
73 Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 725, 745 (2011).
74 Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability (RMP) in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant
and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 201 (1995) (“[Random match probabilities] contribute little
to an assessment of the diagnostic significance of a reported DNA match beyond that given by the
false positive laboratory error rate when RMPs are several orders of magnitude smaller than this
error rate.”); Richard Lempert, After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRC II, 37 JURIMETRICS J.
439, 447 (1997) (noting that “[a]lmost none of the proficiency testing done to date or planned for
the future is truly blind”).
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from the National Research Council, “there have been virtually no blind
proficiency tests designed to estimate case-relevant DNA match error rates.”75
In addition to the use of blind testing procedures, the tests must be
designed to simulate the real-world circumstances that confront the
laboratories and analysts. Just as an easy exam (i.e., a test that all students can
pass regardless of their levels of course knowledge and effort) is not a good
measure of student expertise, an easy proficiency test can be a misleading
measure of expert proficiency. “Proficiency tests have several limitations:
analysts know they are being tested (which may cause them to perform
differently during proficiency tests than when performing casework); the tests
involve relatively few samples; and the tests are typically designed to be
relatively easy for a competent analyst to pass.”76 In hearings conducted by the
National Commission on Forensic Science, the President of CTS stated “that
he has been under commercial pressure to make proficiency tests easier.”77 This
disclosure illustrates the concern that self-regulating industries will fail to
impose on themselves a realistic and exacting blind proficiency testing system.
When states have required that their crime laboratories be accredited,78
not much is required in the way of proficiency testing. The longtime leading
U.S. forensic accreditation organization, ASCLD/LAB, required only that
labs “participate annually in at least one external proficiency test” in each
discipline and use approved test providers, if available.79 But ASCLD/LAB
did not require that the accredited labs make public the results of those
proficiency tests, nor does the accrediting agency monitor proficiency testing
75 Koehler, supra note 25, at 1381 (emphasis omitted). The first NRC report on DNA testing noted
“there is no substitute for rigorous external proficiency testing via blind trials. Such proficiency testing
constitutes scientific confirmation that a laboratory’s implementation of a method is valid not only in
theory, but also in practice.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE 55 (1992). However, the subsequent 1996 NRC report used less emphatic language: “In
open proficiency tests, the analyst knows that a test is being conducted. In blind proficiency tests, the
analyst does not know that a test is being conducted. A blind test is therefore more likely to detect such
errors as might occur in routine operations. However, the logistics of constructing fully
blind proficiency tests [to ensure the laboratory will not suspect that it is being tested] are formidable.”
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 24 (1996).
76 NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION, OPTIMIZING HUMAN
PERFORMANCE IN CRIME LABORATORIES THROUGH TESTING AND FEEDBACK 4 (May 27,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/864776/download [https://perma.cc/G6XV-P72E].
77 Id. at 4 n.10.
78 Some states only require that labs conducting DNA testing for the defense be accredited;
all DNA labs given access to the CODIS databank must be accredited due to FBI rules for
participation in the databank. ERIN MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL 59 (Nation Books 2015); see also
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometricanalysis/codis [https://perma.cc/2C72-MMUL] (discussing how CODIS enables “forensic
laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically”).
79 ASCLD-LAB,
LABORATORY ACCREDITATION BOARD 2005 MANUAL 38,
https://www.scribd.com/document/86600881/ASCLD-LAB-Legacy-Manual-2005-Copy
[https://perma.cc/H9MT-45UF]. Not all crime labs in the U.S. are accredited.
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results. Now ASCLD/LAB has folded in its accreditation services with
another organization, the ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board
(ANAB), which similarly requires that labs conduct external proficiency
testing and submit reports from approved test providers.80
This state of affairs is slowly beginning to change. While some in the
forensics community have long maintained that it is not feasible in many
settings to conduct blind proficiency testing, some laboratories have begun to
do blind proficiency testing as a matter of routine.81 Most notably, the
Houston Forensic Science Center has begun to use blind proficiency testing
for firearms and chemistry analysis, and it plans to extend that proficiency
testing to DNA testing and latent print examination.82 And despite concerns
about the feasibility of blind proficiency testing for DNA analysis,
experiments have shown that realistic and blind proficiency testing can be
done even in this complex setting.83 With some effort and thought,
proficiency testing can be done for any question on which experts routinely
opine. Those proficiency tests should be blind, as well as realistic and
resembling the task for which the person seeks to testify as an expert in court.
A second question is what level of proficiency should be demanded.
Professional organizations and laboratories may demand a high level of
proficiency, and then respond to poor test results with additional training and
testing.84 To qualify as an expert in court, judges should insist at the very least
that the person perform better than chance and better than a layperson would
at the task. For some tasks, false positives may be of special concern, and for
some tasks false negatives may be of concern, and for some tasks both may be
80 Forensic Accreditation, ANSI-ASQ NAT’L ACCREDITATION BD., https://www.anab.org/
forensic-accreditation [https://perma.cc/E4YT-63J5]; see also ANAB, ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR FORENSIC SERVICE PROVIDERS 24 (July 19, 2017), https://anab.qualtraxcloud.com/
ShowDocument.aspx?ID=7183 [https://perma.cc/QZ7C-7RDL].
81 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, Proficiency Tests to Estimate Error Rates in the Forensic Sciences, 12
LAW, PROB. & RISK 89, 94 (2013) (“Blind proficiency testing has been used in some forensic science
areas, including the Department of Defence’s forensic urine drug testing programme and the HIV
testing programme.” (citation omitted)).
82 Hous. Forensic Sci. Ctr., In a National First, HFSC Begins Blind Testing in DNA, Latent Prints,
FORENSIC MAG. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.forensicmag.com/news/2016/11/national-first-hfscbegins-blind-testing-dna-latent-prints [https://perma.cc/WPB8-WPC5].
83 See Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Feasibility Of External Blind DNA Proficiency Testing. II.
Experience With Actual Blind Tests, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 8 (2003) (“We have shown that external
blind proficiency testing in forensic DNA laboratories is possible.”).
84 For example, the originator of proficiency tests for clinical pathology laboratories has
explained the goal as maintaining high standards and identifying ways to improve laboratory
performance. See F. William Sunderman, Twenty-five Years of Proficiency Testing for Clinical
Laboratories, 2 ANNALS OF CLINICAL LABORATORY SCIENCE 420, 422 (1972) (“When the results
of analyses for the solutions of any given month fall outside the allowable range of values, the
directors of the laboratories are encouraged to take an understanding and constructive approach in
their efforts to ascertain the causes for the inaccuracies and to bring about correction.”).
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of great concern. As we will develop in the next Section, beyond meeting
minimal levels of proficiency in order to be qualified as an expert, we counsel
that, whatever a person’s performance on proficiency tests, proficiency
information should be discoverable and admissible at trial.
C. A Case Study: Fingerprint Examiner Proficiency
The story of four decades of fingerprint proficiency testing illustrates the
pitfalls of relying on commercial providers, largely unregulated, to assure
proficiency. In this Section, we report the results of over twenty years of data
on fingerprint proficiency testing that we have collected and analyzed. While
data from the past few years were readily available online, data from several
years ago had to be collected by contacting scholars and practitioners in the
community. The results of this study uncovered widely varying error rates,
with false positive rates ranging from 1% to 23% for 39 proficiency tests
conducted from 1995 to 2016. Overall, the tests had an average 7% false
positive rate and 7% false negative rate during the time period. These results
suggest that far more should be done to carefully test fingerprint examiner
proficiency and to test proficiency more broadly in other fields. After all,
fingerprint analysis is a widely used form of expert evidence; it has been used
for well over a hundred years, with examiners claiming in the past that their
work was “infallible.”85 The White House PCAST report strongly
emphasized proficiency testing is “essential” and should be “required.”86 Our
findings support that conclusion.
Although examiners long claimed not to make mistakes, little was
traditionally done to test whether that was true. From the 1980s through the
mid-1990s, latent fingerprint proficiency testing was conducted only
sporadically.87 By the mid-1990s, however, with annual proficiency testing as
a condition of lab accreditation becoming increasingly common, CTS began
offering annual proficiency tests (and in the last decade, more than one round
of testing per year).88 The test results were closely watched by observers
interested in rates of error in fingerprint testing, and labs were concerned
with what the results might say about their work.89 Yet without good
information about what makes a latent fingerprint more or less challenging

85
86
87

PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 9.
Id. at 10.
See Cole, supra note 25, at 987 (“Latent print examiners have long claimed that fingerprint
identification is ‘infallible.’” (footnote omitted)); see also Koehler, supra note 9, at 1077 & n.2.
88 Cole, supra note 25, at 1029-33; Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime
Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978–1991, II: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 1009, 1010-12 (1995).
89 Id.

2018]

The Proficiency of Experts

925

to match to a known print, it is not completely obvious to a provider like CTS
how to calibrate the difficulty of its tests.
So, when a commercial proficiency test proves too challenging for the
participants, the reaction in the industry may range from “shock to
disbelief,”90 paired with “consternation.”91 CTS administered such a test for
latent fingerprint identification in 1995, with 22% of the participants making
at least one error.92 Some have suspected that CTS’s fingerprint proficiency
tests since 1995 have been “less difficult.”93 But the collected data do not
clearly support that hypothesis. In fact, in the very next year, high error rates
persisted. The report of results for 1996 noted that 38 of the 147 laboratories
(19.89%) “correctly identified less than six of the [nine] latent prints,” and
recommended that those laboratories “review the experience levels of their
examiners and provide additional training,” as well as consider “[a]dditional
internal proficiency testing.”94
We collected the results of 39 CTS proficiency tests in the area of latent
fingerprint comparison conducted from 1995 to 2016 (in some years there
were as many as three tests).95 Participants in these tests knew they were
taking a test (i.e., blind proficiency testing was not used). Laboratories and
participants received test packages in the mail from CTS, and there were no
required time limits on the tests and no required external control to prevent
collaboration or sharing of results.96
The tests provide a set of prints (ranging from seven to twelve prints) and
often involve exemplars from more than one known person. This setup makes
the test easier than if one were comparing unknown prints to similar prints,
90
91

David L. Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521, 524 (1996).
Collaborative Testing Servs., Inc., Forensic Testing Program, Latent Prints Examination,
Report No. 9508 (1995) (on file with authors); Cole, supra note 52, at 1213.
92 Cole, supra note 52, at 1213.
93 Koehler, supra note 9, at 1093 n.53.
94 Collaberative Testing Servs., Inc., Forensic Testing Program, Latent Prints Examination, Report
No. 9608 (1996) (on file with authors).
95 We obtained the proficiency test reports from 2010 through 2015 from CTS itself, and we are
extremely grateful to Simon Cole for sharing prior reports from 1995 through 2009, which he was
able to obtain only through subpoena. CTS makes its reports generally available online. See Forensic
Summary Reports, COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., INC., http://www.ctsforensics.com/reports/
main.aspx [https://perma.cc/VKN6-MYLZ]. It specifically places its latent fingerprint reports online
here: Reports, COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., INC., http://www.ctsforensics.com/reports/
default.aspx?F_CategoryId=21 [https://perma.cc/JK79-STSJ]. Professor Simon Cole has previously
and carefully analyzed the earlier reports from 1995 through 2004 in Grandfathering Evidence, supra
note 52, at 1213.
96 See Cole, supra note 25, at 1029-32, 1072-73 & tbl. (“The tests were conducted by mail under
unproctored, untimed conditions.”); Cole, supra note 52, at 1213 (examining results from 1995
through 2003); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates for Human Fingerprint Examiners, in
AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339 (Ratha and Bolle eds., 2003). See
generally Peterson & Markham, supra note 54 (examining earlier results).
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because even in their gross pattern type (i.e., whether it is a whorl pattern or
a left loop or a right loop or an arch pattern) many of the prints from different
people can be eliminated.97 The tests also usually provide quite clear latent
prints, of questionable resemblance to the often-distorted latent prints
collected from real crime scenes.98 The crime scenarios differ from year to year
as well, as do the number of prints that are to be compared, and the number
of unknown individuals to be compared to the sets of known prints from
individuals identified for the purpose of the test. Complicating interpretation
of the data is the fact that CTS’s reporting of results has varied over time: only
in more recent years has CTS reported inconclusive results for one or more
prints, and for some testing cycles the reporting omits participants (sometimes
for stated and sometimes for unstated reasons). There are also questions
concerning how a result is treated if a response is left blank.
With these caveats in mind, Table 1 summarizes error rates in terms of the
number of participants who made at least one error divided by the total number
of participants.99 Thus, these rates focus on how many individuals made an
error and not on the total numbers of comparisons across individuals (we also
do not measure numbers of errors per examiner). Inconclusive rates are the
number of participants labeling at least one print inconclusive, or not of value
or suitable for comparison, divided by the total number of participants.100

97 Cole, supra note 25, at 1030 (“Fourth, the number of ‘elimination latents,’ or latent prints
that should not be attributed to any of the known prints provided, is relatively small. This may
mitigate the difficulty of these tests.”).
98 Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence Under
Daubert, 7 LAW, PROB. & RISK 87, 95 (2008) (“Further, the prints used in proficiency tests do not
reflect normal casework. They are predominately or entirely of value in contrast to casework, in
which the majority of latent prints are of no value . . . . The results cannot be generalized to the
examiner’s performance on the job, or accuracy in court, because the difficulty of the test items is
unknown, and the other parameters do not correspond to normal casework.”).
99 Alternatively, one could examine mistaken comparisons divided by the total number of
comparisons. CTS unfortunately does not always clearly report inconclusive results, making it
difficult to know the total number of comparisons.
100 All of these rates are somewhat imprecise, partly because CTS itself reports its results in
imprecise and sometimes inaccurate ways. See Cole, supra note 25, at 1072-73 (noting errors in CTS
reporting). In some years, for example, CTS reports an initial number of false positives, but then
notes that, in addition, some number of participants who made false negatives also made false
positives. When that occurs, those numbers are added to the number of false positives. In some years
(e.g., test numbers 2013-516 and 10-517-518), the numbers CTS provides do not add up correctly (it is
not always clear when CTS excludes and includes a participant for some error calculations).
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Table 1: CTS Fingerprint Proficiency Test Results, 1995–2016

Year (Test #)

N of
Prints

N of
Test
Takers

False
Positive
Rate

False
Negative
Rate (N)

Inconclusive
Rate

1995 (9508)

7

156

22% (34)

43% (67)

3% (6)

1996 (9608)

11

184

8% (14)

N/A

N/A

1997 (9708)

11

204

10% (21)

28% (58)

N/A

1998 (9808)

11

219

6% (14)

N/A

35% (77)

1999 (99-516)

12

231

7% (16)101

N/A

32% (75)

2000 (00-516)

10

278

4% (11)

N/A

N/A

2001 (01-516)

11

296

3% (8)

18% (54)

N/A

2001 (01-517)

11

120

20% (24)

N/A

N/A

2002 (02-516)

11

303

4% (13)

N/A

1% (2)

2002 (02-517)

10

146

3% (5)

4% (6)

1% (2)

2002 (02-518)

12

31

0% (0)

3% (1)

3% (1)

2003 (03-516)

10

336

1% (4)

8% (26)

N/A

2003 (03-517)

12

188

1% (5)

12% (22)

N/A

2003 (03-518)

9

28

7% (2)

11% (3)

N/A

2004 (04-516)

12

206

4% (12)

3% (7)

N/A

2004 (04-517-518)

15

259

6% (15)

2% (5)

N/A

2005 (05-516)

16

327

1% (3)

9% (28)

At least 1

2005 (05-517-518)

16

250

5% (12)

2% (6)

N/A

2006 (06-516)

15

333

23% (78)

3% (11)

N/A

2007 (07-516)

15

351

4% (14)

5% (18)

N/A

2007 (07-517-518)

15

315

4% (13)

14% (45)

6% (20)

2008 (08-516)

15

300

1% (3)

5% (14)

N/A

2008 (08-517-518)

15

391

1% (5)

2% (6)

1% (2)

2009 (09-516)

16

321

11% (35)

N/A

N/A

2009 (09-517 -518)

16

419

1% (5)

2% (8)

1% (4)

2010 (10-516)

16

331

8% (26)

2% (5)

N/A

2010 (10-517-518)

16

463

13% (60)

N/A

N/A

2011 (11-516)

15

335

9% (30)

N/A

1% (3)

2011 (11-517-518)

16

478

4% (17)

0

.2% (1)

2012 (12-515-516)

16

350

2% (6)

2% (6)

N/A

2012 (12-517-518)

12

555

3% (16)

1% (8)

N/A

101

This figure is based on Cole’s count of the underlying results. See id. at 1074-75.
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2013 (13-515-516)

12

409102

2% (8)

.2% (1)

6% (24)

2013 (13-517-518)

15

469

3% (12)

8% (38)

N/A

2014 (14-515-516)

12

424

4% (18)

3% (12)

N/A

2014 (14-517-518)

12

587

11% (63)

9% (53)

.3% (2)

2015 (15-515/516)

11

536

7% (39)

11% (58)

.1% (1)

2015 (15-517)

11

509

4% (21)

11% (57)

.1% (1)

2015 (15-519)

3

292

2016 (16-515-516)

16

431

23%

(36)103

10% (41)

N/A

N/A

3% (11)

N/A

Note how few inconclusive results occurred in the most recent tests (i.e.,
where a participant for at least one of the prints reported being unable to
reach a determination). Only .1% did so in a 2015 test, and, in recent years,
the no identification notations often were due to blank responses as opposed
to affirmative claims of inconclusiveness. In some earlier years, when the data
were reported, there were high numbers of inconclusive results—and one
could imagine far more if more of the prints provided were of the realistic
crime-scene type that are often truly unsuitable for any comparison.
Reporting on false negatives also varied, with sometimes quite high rates, and
sometimes no information at all provided.
Comments from test-takers (which CTS, to its credit, publishes) cast doubt
on any belief that these proficiency tests are more difficult than the ordinary
crime scene comparison. Comments on the CTS’s 1999 test include, for
example, “Quite easy!” and “The test was a poor gauge of proficiency. All the
comparisons were very easy,” though another comment said, “Good, fair
realistic test. Very similar to real case work.”104 For a 2015 test, one person
commented, “This test was not as good as last year’s test. Some of the
photographs were not clear and did not appear to be in complete focus or either
lost clarity upon mass duplication,”105 and, in response to a 2014 test, another

102 CTS excluded 199 participants from its results for this test, noting that they were from a
“single subscriber” and “the potential for such a large number relative to the total number of
participants to skew the overall results,” where the participants were said to be “inexperienced,” and
took the test under “proctored, structured conditions in a classroom setting.” Collaborative Testing
Servs., Inc., Forensic Testing Program, Latent Prints Examination, Test No. 13-515 and 13-516, at 3,
https://www.ctsforensics.com/assets/news/3316_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB9E-QURL].
It appears from the responses that those 199 participants made far more errors.
103 This test used a different format designed to assess whether participants could determine
whether latent prints were present on three pieces of evidence.
104 Collaborative Testing Servs., Inc., Forensic Testing Program, Latent Prints Examination,
Test No. 99-516, at 46-47 (on file with authors).
105 Collaborative Testing Servs., Inc., Forensic Testing Program, Latent Print Examination, Test No.
15-515/516, at 25, https://www.ctsforensics.com/assets/news/3516_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8QA-DPC6].
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wrote, “This test seemed less difficult than previous tests taken.”106 Each test
also has a different crime scenario, resulting in this comment on a test from
2013: “I didn’t know the ‘Glee’ cast were criminals!!!”107
CTS itself also comments on the tests, to explain results and sometimes
why participants were excluded. In 2012, CTS explained the exclusion of ten
test-takers: “Ten participants made a note in their additional comments that
latent print 5H appeared to be a footprint. This latent print was created using
the palm of an individual for whom no inked prints were provided.”108 And
in 2010, a particular latent print was excluded from the computation of test
results because 29% of participants failed to identify it correctly.109
Our results reinforce the concerns of other scholars who have analyzed a
subset of these CTS scores in the past and noted the persisting error rates,
uneven reporting, and simplicity of the test designs. As Simon Cole has
observed, since the 1995 test and through 2003, false positive rates dropped
and ranged from 1% to 6%.110 Michael Saks and Jonathan Koehler wrote in
Science that these tests are “obviously imperfect indicators” but they
nonetheless show that fingerprint examiners are not error-free.111 Others,
however, have criticized reliance on CTS results as measures of proficiency
on grounds that many of the errors in attributing prints to individuals are
likely “clerical errors,” due to oversight.112

106 Collaborative Testing Servs., Inc., Forensic Testing Program, Latent Print Examination, Test No.
14-515/516, at 20, https://www.ctsforensics.com/assets/news/3416_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P93-98RY].
107 Collaborative Testing Servs., Inc., Forensic Testing Program, Latent Print Examination, Test No.
13-517/518, at 21, https://www.ctsforensics.com/assets/news/3317_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7CQ-TQXN].
The real import of this note is that it reveals that test-takers obviously know they are taking a test and
may not approach the matter with the same seriousness as they do real criminal investigations. Thus,
a lack of motivation may contribute to error rates. On the other hand, the lack of stress and pressure
to make a comparison should facilitate accurate responding.
108 Collaborative Testing Servs., Inc., Forensic Testing Program, Latent Print Examination, Test No.
12-515 and 516, at 3, https://www.ctsforensics.com/assets/news/3216_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/N73U-79YQ].
109 CTS explained that “the results for Item 5D were such that CTS did not consider that a
consensus result had been obtained and therefore no inconsistencies were assigned to the reported results
for this Item.” Collaborative Testing Servs., Inc., Forensic Testing Program, Latent Print Examination,
Test No. 10-516, at 3 (on file with authors). In other years, CTS reports a higher error rate for a particular
item but notes lower error rates for other items. See, e.g., Collaborative Testing Servs., Inc., Forensic
Testing Program, Latent Print Examination, Test No. 06-516, at 3 (on file with authors).
110 Cole, supra note 52, at 1213.
111 Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification
Science, 309 SCI. 892, 895 (Aug. 5, 2005).
112 Kasey Wertheim, Glenn Langenburg & André Moenssens, A Report of Latent Print Examiner
Accuracy During Comparison Training Exercises, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 55, 59 (2006); for
discussion and further analysis of the data, see Cole, supra note 69, at 81 (noting that “removing
‘clerical errors’ eliminates around forty percent of the false positives and reduces the false positive
error rate from 0.5 percent to 0.3 percent” and asking whether “right-finger-wrong-person” errors
should correctly be considered to be “clerical”).
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On the central question whether these proficiency tests simulate real
casework or not, CTS itself, as noted, disavows any comparison to realistic
casework.113 Yet one central problem is that we do not yet have accepted measures
used to assess the difficulty of latent fingerprints. And as Simon Cole
summarizes, “among other problems,” such commercial proficiency tests are
“taken under unproctored, untimed conditions (test items were mailed to
laboratories and mailed back), and the difficulty of the tests, relative to the usual
tasks performed by fingerprint examiners, remains unmeasured and unknown.”114
Whether one sees proficiency testing simply as a form of training or as a
measure of quality control, the value of the proficiency testing depends on its
ability to simulate the task of interest. To our knowledge, no one has ever
credibly claimed that CTS’s tests present fingerprint examiners with a task
that is more difficult than their real-world task. Nor has anyone shown that
only inexperienced, poorly-performing examiners take the CTS tests. Indeed,
results may be reported for an entire laboratory.115 Absent evidence that the
tests are invalid because they are too difficult or the participant sample is not
representative of the ability distribution found among practicing examiners,
it is fair to use the error rates revealed on the CTS tests as evidence of the
lower bound of error rates within the discipline of fingerprint examination.
To the extent an individual laboratory or examiner fears being portrayed
unfairly by these collective error rates, a simple solution exists: reveal the
results of their own tests showing that they perform better. Until such
individualized proof is provided, we are left with the CTS data showing that
it is not uncommon for many fingerprint examiners in any given year to
exhibit both false positives and false negatives in their fingerprint
identifications on tests that surely do not present more difficult tasks than
many real cases. Given the tremendous volume of work many fingerprint
examiners conduct, an error rate above 1% means that each examiner in a single
year may reach several, if not scores, of false positive and false negative
conclusions. Perhaps laboratory verification procedures will catch many of
these individual errors (and that is the goal of the ACE-V method116), but
laboratories themselves are not foolproof.
The CTS data, despite its flaws, provides insight into the proficiency of
latent fingerprint examiners, many of whom have likely given testimony in
court. The question we now turn to is whether and how this proficiency
information should be used by the judge and jury. Despite its apparent
113
114
115

See text accompanying notes 23 and 77 supra.
Cole, supra note 52, at 1213.
Cole, supra note 25, at 1029 (“The tests were conducted by mail under unproctored, untimed
conditions. It is not known whether the tests were completed by individual examiners or ‘by
committee.’’’ (footnote omitted)).
116 See infra note 123.
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relevance on the question of expert qualifications and for the probative value
of a fingerprint identification or exclusion, judges are surprisingly reluctant
to consider or allow use of proficiency data at trial.
II. JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD PROFICIENCY DATA
We lack information about how well a range of scientific disciplines
perform when experts do work used in litigation. Worse, what we do know
suggests that we have been relying on expert evidence that is far less reliable
than how it has been presented in court. This state of affairs is just now
receiving substantial attention from policymakers and scholars. Most notably,
the 2016 PCAST report described how “proficiency testing, where it had been
conducted, showed instances of poor performance by specific examiners,” in
the area of forensic science.117 However, the gaps in our knowledge have been
apparent for some time. The failure of the judiciary to attend to the problem
of proficiency can be seen in a pair of influential 2002 decisions in which
Judge Louis Pollak of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered
whether the epidermal structures that create fingerprints are unique and
permanent identifiers of individuals, and whether identifications of
individuals based on latent fingerprints recovered from crime scenes are
sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial.118
After hearing from experts on the biology of fingerprints and the method
used by FBI agents to make fingerprint-based identifications,119 Judge Pollak
initially took judicial notice that the skin’s friction ridges create fingerprints
that are unique and permanent identifiers of individuals.120 But Judge Pollak
barred the FBI’s fingerprint examiners from opining that a defendant’s
fingerprints did or did not match latent fingerprints found at the crime scene
because their method of identification was not sufficiently reliable to pass

117
118

PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 4.
United States v. Llera-Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 494-95 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter Llera-Plaza I]. Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence
702 prompted by the Supreme Court’s Daubert, Frye, and Kumho Tire rulings in the 1990s, which
made clear that expert opinions must be based on reliable methods and principles and not simply
methods that had become generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, prompted several
criminal defendants to challenge the admissibility of fingerprint identifications. See FED. R. EVID.
702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. The challenge before Judge Pollak became
particularly noteworthy both because of the evidence presented to Judge Pollak and the opinions
written by Judge Pollak.
119 The evidence Judge Pollak initially considered actually came from a hearing in another case.
See Llera-Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
120 See id. at 502. The utility of fingerprints as a means of identifications depends on the assumption
that fingerprints are permanent, unique identifiers of individuals. The more unique the identifying
characteristic, the greater the probative value the characteristic will have on questions of identity.
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muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.121 In particular, Judge Pollak
concluded that, although the FBI’s method of latent fingerprint identification
had become generally accepted,122 the method had not been subjected to
scientific testing or peer review, the method’s error rate had not been
established, and the ACE-V method then (and now) used in latent fingerprint
identification is not a system of uniform scientific standards.123
Judge Pollak’s initial decision took the criminal justice community by storm.124
As another federal judge later put it, the decision “immediately provoked an
uproar,” and “huge pressure” was placed on Judge Pollak to reverse course.125
The federal government asked for leave to supplement the evidentiary
record in the case to bolster the reliability of latent fingerprint identifications
in hopes of convincing Judge Pollak to change his mind.126 Judge Pollak agreed
to reconsider his opinion, and held a new evidentiary hearing at which the
government put on two witnesses who emphasized that the FBI’s fingerprint

121 Id. at 515 (“While fingerprint examinations conducted under the general ACE V rubric are
generally accepted as reliable by fingerprint examiners, this by itself cannot sustain the government’s
burden in making the case for the admissibility of fingerprint testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.”). Judge Pollak did plan to allow the government to put on evidence of prints
recovered from the crime scene and evidence of the defendant’s fingerprints, but he planned to
prevent either prosecution or defense experts from opining that the crime scene prints matched or
did not match the defendants’ prints; he planned to leave the match/no-match evaluation to the jury.
See id. at 517-18.
122 The FBI’s fingerprint examiners, and other professional print examiners, employ what is
known as the ACE-V method, which stands for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification. See, e.g., Peter E. Peterson et al., Latent Prints: A Perspective on the State of the Science,
11 FORENSIC SCI. COMMS. (Oct. 2009), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensicscience-communications/fsc/oct2009/review [https://perma.cc/A4M6-HFCM] (describing the
ACE-V methodology). At the time of Judge Pollak’s decision, most examiners expressed their
opinions in terms of an identification (i.e., match), elimination (i.e., no match), or insufficient
information to identify or eliminate. See Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d. at 498-500.
123 See id. at 514-16.
124 See, e.g., Michael Higgins, Fingerprint Evidence Put on Trial, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 25, 2002),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-02-25/news/0202250139_1_district-judge-louis-pollak-publicdefender-fingerprint [https://perma.cc/8UQD-59RZ] (highlighting that defense attorneys in
Chicago and throughout the country regard Judge Pollak’s decision as an invitation to challenge
laboratory results and the reliability of fingerprint evidence); Andy Newman, Judge Rules Fingerprints
Cannot Be Called a Match, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/11/us/judgerules-fingerprints-cannot-be-called-a-match.html [https://perma.cc/NXV7-JBJU] (underscoring the
importance of Judge Pollak’s decision because it was the first ruling that fingerprint evidence does not
meet the standards for scientific testimony and likely could lead to challenges in other jurisdictions
and to challenges to other forensic techniques, such as ballistics and handwriting analysis).
125 Jed S. Rakoff, Plenary Speech at National Institute of Standards and Technology
Conference on Forensics: Are Judges Losing Confidence in Forensic Science? (Dec. 3, 2014).
126 Government’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Exclusion of Fingerprint
Identification Evidence and for Permission to Present Limited Additional Evidence at ii, LleraPlaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (No. 98-362).
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examiners achieve high scores on proficiency tests.127 According to the
government’s main witness, the FBI’s fingerprint examiners had performed
“spectacularly well” on proficiency tests conducted since 1995,128 making errors
on fewer than 1% of the test items.129 The defendants, in response, contended
that this low proficiency error rate was achieved not through the application
of a reliable method but rather through the use of easy tests that failed to
simulate the noise and distortions found in latent prints lifted from real crime
scenes.130 According to one of the defense’s fingerprint experts, an esteemed
examiner formerly employed by the Scotland Yard, if he gave his experts tests
like those used by the FBI “they’d fall about laughing.”131
After the hearing, Judge Pollak maintained that the FBI’s proficiency tests
were “less demanding than they should be,”132 but he also concluded that
“there is no evidence that the error rate of certified FBI fingerprint examiners
is unacceptably high.”133 Comparing fingerprint methods in the UK to the
FBI’s methods led Judge Pollak to determine that there was “sufficient
uniformity [in controlling standards] within the principal common law
jurisdictions to satisfy Daubert.”134 Together, this new information led Judge
Pollak to change his mind and conclude that latent fingerprint identifications
are sufficiently reliable to permit examiners to opine on whether crime scene
prints matched the prints of defendants.135
Beyond its practical significance, Judge Pollak’s second decision is
noteworthy for the emphasis it placed on evidence of proficiency testing to
determine the general error rate for a forensic method and for its placing the
burden on opponents of forensic evidence to demonstrate an unacceptably high
error rate. So long as courts take the approach ultimately adopted by Judge
Pollak, the forensic evidence professions have little incentive to engage in
rigorous proficiency testing, yet defendants have no means of compelling
rigorous proficiency testing. Indeed, many courts today deny defense requests
for discovery of proficiency testing information pertaining to the forensic
experts the government intends to call at trial.136
Almost fifteen years after Judge Pollak’s landmark final decision on this
matter—a decision that still carries weight when new challenges to
127 United States v. Llera-Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 553 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter
Llera-Plaza II].
128 Id. at 565.
129 Id. at 556.
130 Id. at 557.
131 Id. at 558.
132 Id. at 565.
133 Id. at 566.
134 Id. at 570.
135 Id. at 576.
136 See infra subsection B.3.d.
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fingerprint identifications arise—we know little more than we did about the
proficiency of fingerprint examiners and the various other forensic experts
who testify every day in courts throughout the nation.137 This unfortunate
state of affairs becomes more pressing when we focus on a curiosity in Judge
Pollak’s reasoning. Judge Pollak altered his view that fingerprint examiners
do not work under uniform quality control standards when he realized that
key jurisdictions had done away with numerical requirements regarding the
minimum number of points of similarity needed to declare a match between
a defendant’s print and a latent print recovered from the crime scene.138 In
other words, the fingerprint examiner community achieved uniformity in
standards by removing any standards with respect to the minimum number of
similarities needed to declare a match.139 Generally, as the degree of objective
control over application of a method goes down, the need for rigorous
proficiency testing and evidence of an individual expert’s proficiency should
go up. Evidence of proficiency is the only assurance we can have that an
individual’s idiosyncratic applications of a general method tend to be reliable,
and this evidence provides only weak protection against intentional and
unintentional abuses of a loose-leash method in particular cases.
This Part turns to the ways in which courts assess proficiency when
making decisions concerning how to handle scientific evidence. Often
proficiency is litigated as one issue among many when challenging or
defending scientific evidence, just as in the Llera Plaza case. Courts vary
widely in their use of proficiency data—with different courts seeing the same
data as evidence of both good or bad proficiency—and they use proficiency
in different ways at different stages in litigation. The sections below discuss
how courts have examined questions concerning proficiency in the context of
deciding whether to: (a) consider proficiency information at all, (b) find
evidence admissible, (c) consider proficiency information as relevant to
weight, and (d) permit discovery on proficiency information. In the final
section we summarize our proposed approach towards judicial regulation of
proficiency data and expert evidence.

137 See, e.g., Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates for Human Latent Fingerprint
Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339, 339 (Nalini K. Ratha &
Ruud Bolle eds., 2004) (“It is impossible to determine from existing data whether true error rates
are miniscule or substantial.”); William A. Tobin & William C. Thompson, Evaluating and
Challenging Forensic Identification Evidence, CHAMPION, July 2006, at 12, 19-20 (“[P]roficiency testing
in forensic science is frequently worthless as a true indicator of examiner proficiency.”); see also Saks
& Koehler, supra note 111.
138 Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 575-76.
139 Id. at 575 (noting that the English fingerprint identification system, “stripped of any
required minimum number” of similarities, “corresponds almost exactly with the ACE-V procedures
followed by the FBI”).
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A. Disregarding Proficiency
Many judicial opinions discussing the qualifications of experts presume
proficiency from credentials and experience, as developed in Part I. Thus,
courts allow doctors to testify as experts offering opinions on the causes of a
condition without any evidence of their accuracy and reliability at
differentiating true from false causes. As the Ninth Circuit recently put it:
“Medicine partakes of art as well as science, and there is nothing wrong with
a doctor relying on extensive clinical experience when making a differential
diagnosis.”140 Such cases often emphasize the qualifications of the relevant
professionals with no discussion of the expert’s track record using differential
diagnosis. Likewise, psychiatrists are given wide latitude to testify so long as
they have training or experience and profess familiarity with relevant
diagnostic criteria and treatment standards.141 Similarly, courts emphasize the
credentials and experience of forensic experts when qualifying them to
testify. For example, the First Circuit in United States v. Vargas admitted
testimony by a fingerprint examiner, noting that the examiner had
“considerable” qualifications, having completed “two FBI courses,” and other
training courses, having worked in the field for twenty years, and having been
found qualified “in over one-hundred previous cases.”142 In such rulings,
having found the expert qualified, the court goes no further in its analysis.
Given their deference to trial judges’ decisions on expert evidence issues,
appellate courts rarely discuss the role of proficiency in the admissibility of
expert evidence. This silence applies even in the domain of fingerprint
expertise, where proficiency data is available, as discussed in the last Part.
Although all of the federal circuits but the Second have considered the
question whether fingerprint identifications should be admissible, only about
half of those courts discuss or mention proficiency as either supportive of or
cutting against admissibility.143 Judicial disregard of proficiency information
140 Messick v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 747 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Bitler v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 391 F.3d 1114, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases regarding admissibility of
differential diagnosis by doctors). For criticism, see, e.g., Joe G. Hollingsworth & Eric G.
Lasker, The Case Against Differential Diagnosis: Daubert, Medical Causation Testimony, and the Scientific
Method, 37 J. HEALTH L. 85, 98 (2004) (claiming that doctors’ clinical causation opinions based on
differential diagnosis are scientifically unreliable and fail to satisfy Daubert’s requirements).
141 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 617-18 (5th Cir.
1999) (noting that an expert witness must employ the level of “intellectual rigor” in the courtroom
that characterizes the practice of an expert in his or her field (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999))).
142 471 F.3d 255, 262 (1st Cir. 2006).
143 See id. (discussing the background and experience of the expert but not proficiency); see
also United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (discussing the failure of the expert
witness “to articulate the rate of human error,” but not proficiency); United States v. Watkins, 450
Fed. Appx. 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that the error rate is just one of several factors to be
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reflects the view that qualifying an expert, as discussed in Part I, is largely a
formality, primarily based on credentials and experience. While Daubert and
Rule 702 tighten the standards for the reliability of the methods and data the
expert uses, the standard for qualification of an expert, as currently interpreted
by judges, remains traditional and not empirically informed in many courts.
B. Admissibility and Proficiency
Those courts that have considered proficiency tend to do so not as part of
the threshold question whether to qualify an expert, but rather as part of
Daubert and Rule 702 reliability analysis. One of the factors the Supreme
Court mentioned in Daubert for assessing reliability was the “known or
potential rate of error” associated with the expert’s technique.144 Therefore,
the focus in these cases has been on the general error rate associated with a
technique, rather than an individual lab or expert’s proficiency.145 Some courts
have found proficiency evidence supportive of admissibility, while others have
found proficiency evidence (sometimes exactly the same evidence) as cutting
against admissibility. Other courts have expressed concerns that proficiency
testing itself is inadequate and not informative, while yet other courts have
found proficiency data irrelevant to the question of admissibility. We have
argued proficiency should be considered at the threshold qualification stage.
While proficiency of a particular expert is related to the broader question
regarding the reliability of the method used, carefully considering proficiency
considered and that the examiner testified regarding “the system of proficiency testing within her
lab”); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 275 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting briefly that the evidence “has
been routinely subject to peer review” and that “the error rate is low”); United States v. Baines, 573
F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing adequacy of proficiency testing); United States v.
Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 663 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing expert testimony but not discussing
proficiency); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing expert testimony
on fingerprint evidence but not proficiency); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666, 672-73 (7th Cir.
2004) (finding fingerprint testimony admissible and noting that “the FBI annually tests its
fingerprint examiners with sets of prints whose sources are known to the testers, but unknown to
the test-takers”); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing fingerprint
expert testimony but not proficiency); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 242 (3rd Cir. 2004)
(raising concerns regarding proficiency); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268-69 (4th Cir. 2003)
(discussing proficiency testing as evidence in support of admissibility); United States v. Sherwood,
98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the Daubert standard for expert testimony but not
proficiency). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in George, 363 F.3d at 673, its prior ruling in Havvard,
which did not consider CTS proficiency test data proffered on appeal because the data were not part
of the district court record. United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 600-01 (7th Cir. 2001).
144 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993); see also FED. R. EVID.
702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments.
145 Ronald G. Nichols, Defending the Scientific Foundations of the Firearms and Tool Mark
Identification Discipline: Responding to Recent Challenges, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 586, 592 (2007)
(“[P]roficiency tests can offer to the court a reliable practical indicator of how often the profession,
using accepted procedures, practices, and controls, makes a false identification.”).
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at the threshold qualification stage can avoid the more complex inquiry into
the Daubert and Rule 702 factors. As the sections that follow describe, courts
have been quite confused in rulings discussing proficiency.
1. Use of Proficiency Data to Exclude Evidence Entirely
Very few courts have concluded that proficiency testing uncovers such
troubling error-rates that a proffered expert should not be allowed to testify.
But one area in which courts agree that the risk of error is too great is that of
polygraph-based opinions. Although some states permit lie detector test
results admissible if the parties stipulate to their admissibility, most states and
the federal courts exclude opinions based on the results of a polygraph test.
For instance, in a Michigan Court of Appeals ruling in 1974, the judges
continued the ban on polygraph evidence, noting the expert in the case
testified how “even at the highest level of proficiency, polygraph examinations
have a ten percent error factor.”146 In more recent years, courts have taken note
of proficiency concerns about handwriting analysis or document examination
after studies alarmingly suggested that experts were no better than laypeople
at detecting forged handwriting.147 One federal judge who excluded testimony
from a forensic document examiner in 2001 stated that, “[i]n addition to there
being a lack of empirical evidence on the proficiency of document examiners,
there has been little empirical testing done on the basic theories upon which
the field is based.”148 The judge went on to note that, “[a]s to some tasks, there
is a high rate of error and forensic document examiners may not be any better
at analyzing handwriting than laypersons.”149 In reference to proficiency tests
administered by CTS in which the task is “to compare written letters in the
natural hand of the writers with known exemplars of several suspects,” the
judge noted that a “test involving hand printing produced only 13% correct
answers.”150 Still more remarkable, “[i]n a test asking examiners to identify the
author of a forgery, the examiners were wrong 100% of the time.”151 In another
study, “laypersons were given the same material as experts were given in the
1987 proficiency study. The true positive accuracy rate of laypersons was the
same as that of handwriting examiners; both groups were correct 52% of the
time.”152 A judge considering whether to qualify another handwriting analyst
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

People v. Levelston, 221 N.W.2d 235, 236 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
See generally Risinger, supra note 58.
United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1102 (D. Alaska 2001).
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted). For an analysis of five sets of proficiency tests conducted by the Forensic
Science Foundation, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 4 MOD. SCI. EVID. § 33:21 (2016–2017 ed.), which
notes “If we assume that inconclusive examinations do not wind up as testimony in court . . . and remain
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noted that, in addition to lacking credentials such as having authored
authoritative texts or completing training for certification, there is “no
evidence that he is routinely subjected to proficiency tests or that his work is
regularly reviewed by at least one qualified document examiner.”153
In a child pornography case in which an expert for the government sought
to opine on whether images in the possession of the defendant represented
real or virtual children, the judge asked whether the expert’s proficiency at
this authentication task had been tested by supervisors: “[The analyst]
responded, ‘I’ve never been tested.’”154 The judge concluded that, “[a]bsent
this type of proficiency testing, neither this Court nor the jury can assess the
reliability” of the specific person’s work, a particular concern “where, as here,
the field as a whole has no known error rates, making it impossible to guess
how often [the analyst] is likely to be right or wrong.” 155
Outside of polygraph examiners, document examiners, and the occasional
fingerprint examiner, 156 it is rare for judges to examine proficiency data, much
less exclude an expert for a lack of demonstrated proficiency. Indeed, state
courts have interpreted Judge Pollack’s opinion in the Llera-Plaza case as
signaling good proficiency on the part of fingerprint examiners.157 Thus, not
only do most judges disregard proficiency at the threshold when deciding

as generous as possible within the bounds of reason, then the most we can conclude is this: Document
examiners were correct 57% of the time and incorrect 43% of the time.”. But see Oliver Galbraith, Craig
S. Galbraith & Nanette Galbraith, The “Principle of the Drunkard’s Search” as a Proxy for Scientific Analysis:
The Misuse of Handwriting Test Data in a Law Journal Article, 1 INT’L J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT
EXAMINATION 7 (1995); see also Moshe Kam et al., Signature Authentication by Forensic Document
Examiners, 46 J. FORENSIC. SCI. 884, 887 (2001) (finding that expert document examiners made fewer
errors than laypeople on tests); Moshe Kam & Erwei Lin, Writer Identification Using Hand-Printed and
Non-Hand-Printed Questioned Documents, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1391 (2003) (same); Jodi Sita et al., Forensic
Handwriting Examiners’ Expertise for Signature Comparison, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 4 (2002) (finding that
examiners detected forgeries in 55% of the test cases while laypeople did so in 57% of the test cases).
153 Dracz v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1378-79 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
154 United States v. Frabizio, 445 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D. Mass. 2006).
155 Id.
156 In the case of State v. Rose, the judge excluded a fingerprint examiner from the FBI after
he claimed “no error rate” for fingerprinting and “100 percent certainty.” State v. Rose, No. K060545, at 24-25 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore Co. Oct. 19, 2007) (“Mr. Meagher has stated that the FBI testifies
to ‘a 100 percent certainty that we have an identification.’ . . . . Mr. Meagher claimed that there is
no error rate for [the fingerprint technique] ACE-V.” (footnote omitted)). That Maryland ruling
was then vacated when state prosecutors dropped the charges and federal prosecutors refiled the
case in federal court—and the federal judge found the fingerprint evidence admissible. United States
v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d. 723, 726 (D. Md. 2009).
157 See, e.g., State v. Escobido-Ortiz, 126 P.3d 402, 411 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that
fingerprint “[a]nalysts are also consistently subjected to testing and proficiency requirements”)
(citing Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 566-71 (E.D. Pa. 2002) and United States v. Havvard, 260
F.3d 597, 599 (11th Cir. 2011)); Barber v. State, 952 So.2d 393, 420-22 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (citing
Llera Plaza II repeatedly to show that fingerprint analysis has “strong general acceptance, not only
in the expert community, but in the courts as well”).
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whether to qualify an expert, but they do not engage with the proficiency data
at the admissibility or reliability stage of the analysis either.
2. Concerns with General Inadequacy of Proficiency Testing
Some courts, while not ultimately excluding the expert evidence, have
found that proficiency testing is relevant and that it raises important—though
not dispositive—concerns regarding admissibility. Such rulings at least make
proficiency data salient, while not considering it as a question of expert
qualification as we have recommended. In United States v. Mitchell, the Third
Circuit highlighted the lack of any proficiency testing on the part of the
individual examiners, warning that “prosecutors would be well-advised to
elicit testimony about their experts’ personal proficiency, rather than relying
on the discipline’s good general reputation among lay jurors”—but ultimately
deeming the evidence admissible.158 In the area of DNA testing, several courts
have discussed the recommendation of the initial National Research Council
report on DNA evidence, in 1992, that recommended blind proficiency
testing.159 One federal judge explained that the lack of blind testing was
“troubling” but nevertheless admitted the evidence.160 Following suit, another
federal judge added: “Absent evidence demonstrating that the particular
quality control procedures followed by the FBI laboratory violated a statute,
regulation or a generally accepted industry requirement, these issues impact
the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.”161
Other judges have raised concerns that proficiency tests are available, but
appear not to be informative. Thus, Judge Pollack in the second Llera-Plaza
decision did express concern that the FBI’s proficiency tests were “less
demanding than they should be” and therefore “can be of little assistance in
providing the test makers with a discriminating measure of the relative
competence of the test takers.”162 Similarly, when ruling on handwriting
evidence, a federal judge noted that proficiency testing was “not meaningful”
when “all of [the expert’s] peers always passed.”163 Another judge reasoned, in
response to a challenge to handwriting testimony based on error rates from
CTS proficiency tests, that “this data lacks a control group and other hallmarks

158
159
160
161

365 F.3d 215, 242 (3d Cir. 2004).
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 560 (6th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Lowe, 954 F. Supp. 401, 420 (D. Mass. 1996); see also Commonwealth v.
Teixeira, 662 N.E.2d 726, 729 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996), review denied, 664 N.E.2d 1197 (Mass. 1996)
(“Weaknesses in the laboratory’s proficiency testing went to the weight to be ascribed to the evidence
of match, not to its admissibility.”).
162 Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
163 United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002).
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of scientific rigor.”164 In considering a challenge to a firearms expert, Judge
Nancy Gertner wrote that, “[b]ecause of the subjective nature of the matching
analysis, a firearms examiner must be qualified through training, experience,
and/or proficiency testing to provide expert testimony.”165 In response to
evidence that none of 255 test-takers gave an incorrect response on a CTS
proficiency test for bullet cartridge case examination, the judge noted: “One
could read these results to mean that the technique is foolproof, but the results
might instead indicate that the test was somewhat elementary.”166
3. Judicial Acceptance of Proficiency
Occasionally courts cite proficiency data from a field of expertise or from
an individual expert to support the admissibility of expert evidence, particularly
with respect to latent fingerprint examiners. Such rulings raise the concern
that judges do not inquire carefully into whether the proficiency testing is
realistic or into the proficiency test results of the examiner seeking to testify.
a. General Proficiency
Courts have cited proficiency testing within a field to support the
admissibility of drug testing,167 DNA evidence,168 boot-print matches,169
firearms examination,170 and document examinations.171 To judges, field-wide
data can apparently make up for the lack of individualized data: an expert on
footwear impressions was permitted to testify despite a lack of evidence on
this expert’s “proficiency in obtaining impression evidence, how frequently
he utilizes his training in the area of impression evidence, how often he
is proficiency tested, etc.” because the government “established that
164
165
166
167

United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964 n.7 (D. Ariz. 2002).
United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 355 (D. Mass. 2006).
Id. at 367.
See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-0167, 2006 WL 3512032, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
6, 2006) (reasoning that a crime lab’s identification of cocaine was admissible because the results of
blind proficiency tests in the lab showed that the error rate was “exceedingly low”).
168 See, e.g., United States v. Peters, No. CR 91-395-SC, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20950, at *58
(D.N.M. Sept. 7, 1995) (noting that external proficiency testing would be “the ideal” but finding
internal FBI proficiency testing supportive of admissibility); see also Morris v. Presley, No. 1:05cv330-LG-RHW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84767, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 8, 2008) (finding Reliagene (a
company that conducts DNA testing) proficiency testing supportive of admissibility).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 287 Fed. App’x. 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that
yearly proficiency testing by an independent agency supported admissibility of shoeprint analysis).
170 See, e.g., United States v. Otero, 849 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433-34 (D.N.J. 2012) (finding evidence
by firearms examiners to be admissible where proficiency testing indicated a low error rate).
171 See, e.g., United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that testimony by
a handwriting expert was admissible where the expert testified that he submitted to proficiency tests
regularly); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1160-61 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that expert
handwriting analysis was admissible where the expert had been subject to training and testing).
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examiners of footwear and other impression evidence are routinely tested to
ensure proficiency in the field.”172
Spurred by Judge Pollak’s decision in the Llera-Plaza case, federal courts
have most commonly discussed proficiency data with respect to the field of
fingerprint examinations.173 The various Courts of Appeals to have
considered the question of fingerprint admissibility—the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C.
Circuits—have all found fingerprint examinations to be sufficiently reliable
to be admissible under Daubert.174 Few of these courts have engaged in close
analysis of the proficiency data, however.
The Tenth Circuit, in its decision in United States v. Baines, did examine the
proficiency question more closely, stating that FBI fingerprint analysts “have
undergone demanding training culminating in proficiency examinations, followed
by further proficiency examinations at regular intervals during their careers.”175
The judges concluded that, “[a]lthough these proficiency examinations have been
criticized on several grounds, most notably that they do not accurately represent
conditions encountered in the field, we see no basis in this record for totally
disregarding these proficiency tests.”176 Subsequent courts have endorsed the
Tenth Circuit’s conclusion.177
In United States v. Mitchell, the defendant presented at a Daubert hearing
proficiency tests showing that fingerprint examiners make both false
negatives and false positives.178 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel
stated that this proficiency data “is troubling, but we view it as evidence
172 United States v. Allen, 207 F. Supp. 2d 856, 864, 866 (N.D. Ind. 2002). The judge reasoned
that because “the processes for obtaining footwear impression evidence and fingerprint
identification evidence are similar,” the court could rely on the holdings of Daubert and Kumho Tire
to conclude that the process is sufficiently reliable. Id. at 867.
173 Of eight cases in the federal Courts of Appeals located through a Westlaw search that
included the term “proficiency” in the same paragraph as “Daubert,” one case discusses boot print
analysis, see Turner, 287 Fed. Appx. 426, supra note 170, one discusses handwriting analysis, see Jones,
107 F.3d 1147, supra note 172, and the remaining six discuss fingerprints.
174 See United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 630-32 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States v. Watkins,
450 Fed. Appx. 511, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d
641, 663 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 265-66 (1st Cir. 2006); United States
v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244-46 (3rd Cir.
2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d
261, 268-69 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) .
175 573 F.3d at 990.
176 Id.
177 E.g., United States v. Love, No. 10cr2418–MMM, 2011 WL 2173644, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2011)
(“The FBI also conducts proficiency examinations of its examiners, which—even if taken under
conditions that ‘do not accurately represent [those] encountered in the field’—are of some value in
assessing the reliability of individual examiners.” (quoting Baines, 573 F.3d at 990)).
178 Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 239-40.
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relating only to the competency of those practitioners, leaving undisturbed
the government’s evidence about the near-absence of false positive
identifications” for the field as a whole.179
b. Individual and Lab Proficiency
When individualized proficiency data of the kind the Third Circuit
sought exists, courts are mixed in their use of this data. Some courts highlight
this data in support of admissibility, for example citing how a hospital passed
proficiency tests in its analysis of blood to assess alcohol concentration of
drivers,180 or how a DNA laboratory regularly gave proficiency tests to its
analysts and compared their work to that in other laboratories.181 One court
noted that “[s]ince its inception, Reliagene has undergone proficiency testing
by an outside agency approved by the American Society of Crime Lab
Directors—the lab, every analyst, every technician undergoes such testing
twice a year, and ReliaGene’s results have always proved correct.”182 A First
Circuit ruling highlighted how an examiner, conducting footwear
comparisons, is “subject to annual proficiency testing by an outside agency.”183
Other courts disregard individualized proficiency data. One court held,
for example, that a lack of proficiency testing was not an obstacle to
admissibility of DNA tests, even though the laboratory had lost its
accreditation at the time it conducted the relevant DNA testing.184 Another
court treated individualized proficiency information as irrelevant to the
question whether the expert evidence was reliable:
A laboratory’s error rate is a measure of its past proficiency that is of limited
value in determining whether a test has methodological flaws. Since Rule
702’s reliability requirement focuses on the validity of the test rather than the
proficiency of the tester, the absence of a laboratory error rate will rarely be
dispositive if the rest of the evidence establishes that the test has been
properly validated.185

Endorsing the same view, another court rejected a defendant’s attempt to
exclude evidence by pointing to errors found in proficiency testing and
characterized the defendant as trying to “challenge the proficiency of the
tester,” when Rule 702 and Daubert are concerned only with “the reliability of
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. at 240.
Barna v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 508 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
Johnson v. Runnels, No. C 02-5537 CW (PR), 2006 WL 823060, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2006).
Morris v. Presley, No. 1:05cv330-LG-RHW, 2008 WL 4186932, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 8, 2008).
United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 70 (1st Cir. 2006).
J.H.H. v. State, 897 So.2d 419, 425-26 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
United States v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 340 (D.N.H. 1997). This opinion has been influential.
See United States v. Ewell, 252 F. Supp. 2d 104, 114 (D.N.J. 2003) (quoting Shea, 957 F. Supp. at 340).
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the test.”186 In the view of these courts, individual- or lab-level proficiency
data may be relevant to weight but not admissibility.
c. Weight and Proficiency
Factfinders should have a full opportunity to assess the performance of an
expert and not just the expert’s credentials and experience. Proficiency data
can give the factfinder a superior and empirically-informed picture of that
expert’s performance. While proficiency information should be considered in
the qualification and Daubert reviews, if an expert is permitted to take the
stand, proficiency data should be admitted because it is relevant to the weight
that should be given to the expert’s opinions. Judges have largely correctly
treated proficiency data as relevant to weight. Unfortunately, a number of
courts treat proficiency data as going only to the weight of the evidence rather
than admissibility. For example, in a case in which a DNA analyst had failed
a proficiency test, the court stated that this “was relevant to the weight that
her opinion should carry generally,” but not to the “general issue of the
admissibility of DNA comparisons.”187 The court went on to explain that
“failure had no more relevance to the admissibility of the PCR technique any
more than a particular fingerprint expert’s poor eyesight has on the general
admissibility of fingerprint comparison evidence.”188 This failure “was
relevant to impeach the credibility of [the expert] personally, not DNA
evidence generally.”189 In that case, the prosecution only disclosed the
proficiency results during trial; the defense objected to the late disclosure,
but the appellate court ultimately concluded that the judge’s instructions to
the jury cured the failure to disclose.190 To avoid problems of the kind
encountered by the defense in this case, discovery of proficiency data should
be permitted, as we develop more in the next Section.
Courts have also ruled that the failure to properly conduct regular
proficiency testing goes to the weight of the evidence. This issue has most
frequently been litigated in cases involving DNA testing, and a large number

186 United States v. Wrensford, Criminal Action No. 2013-0003, 2014 WL 1224657, at *11 (D.V.I.
Mar. 25, 2014) (quoting Ewell, 252 F. Supp. at 114).
187 People v. Tillet, 108 Cal. Reptr. 2d 76, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis omitted). The
court stated: “The issue of [the expert’s] failing a proficiency test was relevant to the weight that
her opinion should carry generally; it had no relevance to the general issue of the admissibility of DNA
comparisons by the PCR method, which is the purpose of a Kelly hearing.” Id.; see also United States v.
Yagman, No. CR 06-227(A)-SVW, 2007 WL 4409618, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2007) (ruling in the
context of studies of proficiency in handwriting, but not proficiency data concerning the examiner
testifying in the case).
188 Tillet, 108 Cal. Reptr. 2d at 91.
189 Id. at 92.
190 Id. at 93.
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of courts have ruled that it is an issue of weight, often in cases in which DNA
labs did not routinely proficiency test their analysts.191
While some courts do allow questions about proficiency on cross-examination
of forensic experts, courts have often found that the denial of proficiency data or
of questioning about proficiency are harmless errors because the topics only affect
the credibility of a witness. For example, a Virginia court noted proficiency
information “would not have affected the admissibility of the DNA evidence, but
rather, would have only affected the weight the fact finder accorded the DNA
evidence.”192 In that case, however, the analyst had passed prior proficiency
tests.193 Had the proficiency information been negative, we are skeptical the
proficiency of an expert would be discounted by jurors. Such data might have a
strong impact on outcomes; more work should be done to assess the question of
how laypeople evaluate proficiency data.194
Courts should be reluctant to qualify experts for whom no proficiency
data is available. If that person is proficient and qualified, however,
proficiency information should go to weight, meaning that proficiency data
should be admissible and presented to the jury. While there may be difficult
questions regarding what level of proficiency should be demanded in
particular fields, one solution to that challenge is to simply let the jury
determine how an expert’s proficiency level, particularly as compared to that
of any competing experts, affects the credibility of the expert’s opinions.
d. Discovery of Proficiency Data
Before a party may inquire into the proficiency of an expert, wise counsel
will first possess proficiency data. Without advance discovery and access to the
information needed to impeach untruthful answers, it could be perilous for a
lawyer to inquire into an expert’s proficiency. As the Advisory Committee’s
Note to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 emphasizes, “it is difficult to test

191 See United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1996) (ruling that the alleged lack
of “frequent external proficiency testing” and “double blind external tests to check results and to
show that proper procedures are being followed” will “go to the weight of the DNA evidence”); State
v. Tankersley, 956 P.2d 486, 492-93 (Ariz. 1998) (discussing the question of a lab’s lack of “current
proficiency testing” where the lab had not participated in proficiency tests for two years as a matter
that goes to weight), abrogated by State v. Machado, 246 P.3d 632 (Ariz. 2011) on other grounds;
Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 662 N.E.2d 726, 729 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (“Weaknesses in the
laboratory’s proficiency testing went to the weight to be ascribed to the evidence of match, not to
its admissibility.”); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512 (Wash. 1993) (noting that cross-examination
addressed errors made in a state proficiency study).
192 Keen v. Commonwealth, 485 S.E.2d 659, 663 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
193 Id. at 662.
194 A work in progress by the Authors presents the results of an experiment asking laypersons
to evaluate proficiency data in the context of a hypothetical criminal case.
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expert testimony at trial without advance notice and preparation.”195 However,
Rule 16 does not provide for disclosure of credentials or proficiency data of
experts, but rather just the reports and summaries of conclusions the experts
reached.196 Under the Federal Civil Rules, parties must disclose an expert
witness’s qualifications, including publications, compensation to be paid, and
lists of cases in which the witness testified, but not necessarily evidence of
proficiency.197 Nonetheless, judges have discretion to order broader expert
discovery under both criminal and civil procedure rules.
The rarity with which discovery rulings are the subject of appeal or
published opinions makes the survey of discovery practices an imperfect
enterprise. But one still finds cases in which the courts conclude that
proficiency data is not material to a criminal defendant’s defense or of
sufficient relevance to compel discovery in civil cases.198 In criminal cases,
discovery about forensics more generally is quite limited. Defense requests
for proficiency data may be part of omnibus requests for information about
the underlying bench notes and reports underlying the forensic conclusions,
laboratory protocols and procedures, and information about the expert’s
training and experience.199 Courts that are reluctant to grant broad discovery
regarding other aspects of the expert’s work and the laboratory’s practices are
likely to be similarly reluctant to grant discovery of materials regarding
proficiency. Recently, the National Commission on Forensic Science
encouraged greater pre-trial discovery with regard to forensic evidence, but
it may be some time before these recommendations gain traction.200
Other courts have ruled that proficiency evidence is discoverable and
should be shared by the parties. The Maryland Court of Appeals, for example,
highlighted how the analyst’s “record in proficiency tests,” was “relevant to the
195
196
197
198

FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(A)(1)(D)–(G).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(2)(B).
See e.g., Samatar v. Clarridge, No. 2:04-CV-1108, 2006 WL 355684, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
16, 2006) (explaining that petitioner’s request for discovery of proficiency tests was denied).
199 See, e.g., Notice of Motion and Motion to Exclude Fingerprint Identification Testimony
and Request for Daubert Hearing, And Motion for Discovery, United States v. Ablett, No. CR 09
0749 RS, 2012 WL 8499482, at *2 (N.D. Cal Jan. 17, 2012) (holding that the Court could not
effectively perform its evidentiary gatekeeping function under Daubert and Rules 104(a) and 702
because the government “fail[ed] to provide the defendant with the actual points of identification
being relied upon by the expert, her laboratory protocol for performing the evaluation,
her proficiency tests, and other materials necessary to the fair presentation of this motion.”).
200 NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL REGARDING PRETRIAL DISCOVERY (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.ascld.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Initial-Draft-Recommendations-on-Pretrial-Discovery.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RF5N-92FU]. We note that the recommendations direct federal prosecutors to
provide pre-trial discovery on a number of subjects, including the witness’s qualifications—but this
document did not specifically highlight proficiency as a relevant aspect of the witness’s qualifications.
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weight the fact-finder might give the test results.”201 Courts have specifically
held that discovery on the issue of proficiency is important with respect to
black-box experts: “[T]he subjectivity of firearms toolmark identification
methodology places a great degree of emphasis on the individual’s training
and proficiency . . .”202 The Court of Appeals of South Carolina held that a
trial court abused its discretion by not ordering the prosecutor to turn over
proficiency tests of DNA experts, including as potential impeachment
material—but the state Supreme Court reversed the lower appellate court,
finding “that the nondisclosure of proficiency test results was not material.”203
The court reasoned “the test results could only have reduced the probabilities.
Even if the ‘lab error rate’ resulted in a 90% reduction . . . those numbers
would still be staggering: 1 in 450 million Caucasians and 1 in 37 million
African–Americans.”204 The court added that the analyst “acknowledged
during his testimony that errors are made in every lab, and that those errors
affect the validity of the probability determination.”205
A party may separately seek discovery of an entire laboratory’s
proficiency. Courts appear to be even more reluctant to order discovery of
this broader data. For example, a Virginia appellate court ruled that a lower
court could refuse further discovery of proficiency information after the
government provided a memo stating the results of three proficiency tests by
the analyst in question but not others sought by the defendant.206
We view such rulings denying discovery on questions of proficiency as
misguided: because many individuals within a laboratory other than the
testifying expert may participate in the testing connected to a particular case,
lab-wide proficiency information would shed light on how expert the
laboratory as a whole is at the task that generated evidence against the
defendant. Generally, courts should permit discovery on proficiency and
allow the factfinder to consider individual-level proficiency as well, just as the
factfinder may consider an expert’s credentials and experience. Proficiency
can allow the factfinder to far better assess what weight to place on an expert’s
testimony. Jurors should have information about the actual performance of an
expert and not just their professional pedigree.

201
202
203

Cole v. State, 835 A.2d 600, 610 (Md. 2003).
United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536, 578 (D. Md. 2010).
State v. Proctor, 358 S.C. 417, 480 (S.C. 2004) (discussing State v. Proctor, 347 S.C. 587,
603 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001)).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Hodges v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 846, 851 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
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e. Rethinking Proficiency and Judicial Gatekeeping
As described in this Part, many judges have seen little value in proficiency
data, and proficiency data is not directly addressed in discovery rules. The
rules for the qualification of experts focus on credentials and experience
rather than actual performance and proficiency. When proficiency is
addressed, largely in criminal cases, it is used in general ways to justify
admissibility, even when the limited proficiency testing data available
suggests real problems with the testimony. While case-by-case adjudication
may not effectively set up a comprehensive framework to regulate quality of
scientific evidence, we suggest that judges could use individual expert
proficiency information to make better rulings on expert evidence.
Our argument is that before courts even reach the question of whether an
expert used sufficient data and a reliable method to reach a reliable opinion
in this case, the court should investigate more critically whether the putative
expert truly has expertise in the domain in which the witness is offered as an
expert. First, the expertise inquiry is much simpler to conduct than the
reliability inquiry. A judge can look for empirical evidence that the person is
proficient at a particular task or has esoteric knowledge on some point of
relevance. If not, then no further inquiry is needed. Second, this inquiry is
particularly important for the sub-group of experts who employ subjective
methods to reach their opinions. Any person who claims to be an expert in
some domain, whether that expertise supposedly comes from using a
subjective or objective method, should be able to demonstrate that expertise
through performance-based proficiency testing. Third, accompanying such a
threshold inquiry into proficiency, judges should routinely require discovery
on the proficiency of experts. Fourth, judges could take proficiency into
account, and if a proffered expert is lacking, the judge could retain a more
proficient expert. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 is a tool that is “virtually
unquestioned” and yet it is lamented by scholars that it is so infrequently
used—it allows the judge to exercise discretion to appoint an expert of its
choosing—and appointing another expert of greater proficiency would be a
sound exercise of discretion.207 The Court in Daubert highlighted how Rule
207 FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. A pre-Daubert survey
of federal judges sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center found “uneasiness with court-appointed
experts” due to a system in which judges value “adversarial presentation of evidence.” Joe S. Cecil &
Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
525, 530 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed., 1994). A more recent survey of state judges in states that do not follow
Daubert found many judges did report appointing experts and were willing to do so. Stephanie
Domitrovich, Mara L. Merlino, and James T. Richardson, State Trial Judge Use of Court Appointed
Experts: Survey Results and Comparisons, 50 JURIMETRICS 371, 371 (2010). Many of those judges
stated they believed court-appointed experts should be more common and 37% stated a preference
for court-appointed experts. Id. at 388.
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706 provides an additional tool to procure expert witnesses.208 By reorienting
expert qualification around proficiency, Rule 706 could also become a far more
useful tool for judges.
i. Proficiency, Qualification, and Admissibility
The proficiency of a proffered expert should be central to the threshold
question asking whether a person should be qualified as an expert, as we have
proposed, but that proficiency information can additionally inform the
second stage of the analysis, focusing on the multi-factored Daubert and Rule
702 examination of the validity and reliability of the method. For a subjective
or “black box” method, the process is not transparent and the only way to
assess its accuracy and reliability is to have proficiency data. Thus, Daubert
analysis can be informed by the proficiency and error rates of the particular
expert, and not just of the field as a whole. Where the expert cannot point to
an objective, validated method for reaching a conclusion, proficiency testing
is the only means to discern how reliable the expert’s method really is.
A more difficult question is what minimal proficiency judges should
demand in order for evidence to be admissible. No one threshold may be
imposed. We have already stated that any expert should at minimum be able
to show that she can perform better than chance and better than a layperson,
in order to claim expertise in a subject. Any evidence that analysts had
repeatedly done poorly on proficiency tests, by the standards of their
discipline, would be important information for a judge to have. What to do
with that information may depend on what use the evidence is being put to,
and more work would have to be done to assess what thresholds are
appropriate for particular disciplines, including as to false positive, false
negative, and inconclusive results on proficiency tests. However, courts
should be wary of proficiency results derived from tests that have extremely
low error rates in the aggregate: either such tests are very easy or the task at
hand is very easy—raising questions about whether expertise is even needed
to perform the task. An analyst may be quite proficient at DNA testing
generally, but a case involving a difficult and more specific question of
interpreting a possible DNA mixture may implicate a different type of
proficiency. Judges must be sensitive to these differences.
ii. Rethinking Proficiency in the Courtroom
Assuming judges typically find expert evidence admissible, as they
currently do, they should permit the jury to hear detailed information about
208 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“Rule 706 allows the court
at its discretion to procure the assistance of an expert of its own choosing.”).
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proficiency. Proficiency matters when an expert takes the stand. Indeed, the
most common rulings on the subject involve judges holding that proficiency
goes to weight and not to admissibility. If so, judges should be open to
discovery on the question of proficiency, should allow questioning regarding
proficiency, and should permit other experts to testify regarding the lack of
proficiency in a forensic field.209
There are constitutional implications to the failure to provide access to
proficiency information in pre-trial discovery and at trial in criminal matters.
While the Supreme Court has held over the past decade that the Sixth
Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses includes the right to
question adverse expert witnesses, we submit that having sound proficiency
information can make the right to question expert witnesses far more
meaningful.210 A jury should hear detailed information about the proficiency
of a testifying expert. Without such information, jurors may have little way
to assess the accuracy of the evidence being presented to them. Indeed, there
is evidence that jurors assume that the accuracy of forensic science evidence
is very high and that the risks of error are vanishingly low.211 There is also
evidence, from a study that we have just conducted, that jurors understand
and take into account information about an expert’s proficiency when
determining the weight of the expert’s opinion.212
If proficiency testing is not conducted, the other side should be permitted
to benefit from an adverse inference concerning the expert evidence—and
point out to the jury that the proficiency of the expert is unknown. The result
may encourage careful collection of proficiency data in the first instance.

209 Some of the cases deeming the evidence of proficiency sufficient note that no contrary
expert testimony was offered. See, e.g., United States. v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 (D. Md.
2004) (stating that “[n]o contrary expert testimony was offered”).
210 See Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1147, 1150 (2016) (discussing those Sixth Amendment rulings).
211 See Jonathan J. Koehler, Intuitive Error Rate Estimates for the Forensic Sciences, 57
JURIMETRICS J. (forthcoming 2018) (“[C]ourts should take seriously the possibility that jurors will
overweight various types of forensic science evidence because they mistakenly believe that the risk
of error is infinitesimal.”); Joel D. Lieberman, Courtney A. Carrell, Terance D. Meithe & Daniel A.
Krauss, Gold Versus Platinum: Do Jurors Recognize the Superiority and Limitations of DNA Evidence
Compared to Other Types of Forensic Evidence?, 14 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y., & L. 27, 27 (2008) (finding
that DNA evidence strongly influences verdict decisions, whether the evidence is incriminating or
exculpatory); see also Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, Forensics and Fallibility: Comparing the
Views of Lawyers and Judges, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 621, 636 (2016) (“[O]ur results suggest that most
jurors will enter the courtroom with a default view that both DNA and fingerprinting evidence are
at least somewhat reliable, if not nearly infallible.”).
212 Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 211.
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III. REGULATING EXPERT EVIDENCE
In addition to the role of judges as gatekeepers for the quality of expert
evidence in litigation, a regulatory approach towards the production and use
of expert evidence could improve proficiency across a range of disciplines and
ensure that there is sound proficiency data on which judges and factfinders
could rely. Scholars have increasingly described administrative law
approaches towards law enforcement and prosecution generally, where
individual case-specific criminal procedure rules do not adequately address
systemic issues.213 In the area of scientific evidence, the scientific community
itself recommends a regulatory model. The National Academy of Sciences in
its 2009 recommendations, the White House PCAST report, and other
scientific groups and policymakers have all called for federal involvement in
the evaluation and oversight of forensic evidence.214 Scientific research and
laboratory research is more commonly regulated, and not just when the
evidence used is produced for litigation. The benefits of regulation flow to
judges, who may not be in a position to assure sound quality control in lab
settings in the first instance, while administrative agencies can directly
oversee quality. Existing federal regulation of proficiency for clinical
laboratories provides a model for the regulation of forensic laboratories, and
helpful guidance can also be found in other nations that regulate the
proficiency of forensic analysts.
A. Federal Regulation of Proficiency
In most areas, expert evidence lacks the type of comprehensive regulation
that we recommend in this Article, but routine proficiency testing is both
feasible and required by regulation in certain fields. In one area in particular,
there has been substantial federal regulation of proficiency. Unlike the
forensics context, in which laboratories self-regulate through voluntary
accreditation and there is no federal agency tasked with developing standard
proficiency tests, in the medical context, the federal Centers for Disease

213 See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2105-06 (2016) (urging courts to broaden the audience that can
evaluate expert proficiency); Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
383, 383 (2007) (advocating for aggregation in criminal proceedings as a way to “create a more
efficient, accurate, and fair criminal justice system”).
214 NAS Report, supra note 21, at 19 (recommending that Congress establish the National
Institute of Forensic Science to enforce standards in the forensic science field); PCAST Report,
supra note 6, at 14-15.
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Control and Prevention and other agencies at the state level provide medical
laboratories with proficiency tests.215
This improved process is due, in large part, to the enactment of the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) of 1967216 and subsequent strengthening
of this act. In the mid-1980s, journalists wrote about misdiagnosed cancer and lax
standards at labs conducting cytology tests of Pap smears.217 There were concerns
with labs failing to identify Pap smears as abnormal, resulting in “large numbers
of false negative results, contributing to unnecessary suffering and even death in
women who did not receive prompt treatment for cervical cancer.”218 The
resulting concern with laboratory proficiency led to the enactment in 1988 of a
law strengthening the CLIA and extending the CLIA to all clinical laboratories,
whether public or not (so long as they participate in the federal Medicare
program or ship items in interstate commerce). “Regular proficiency testing was
vital evidence of a laboratory’s competence.”219 All medical laboratories must
either be CLIA-exempt or have a certificate of registration and compliance and
accreditation under the relevant federal regulations.220 That law required that
proficiency testing reflect “to the extent practicable . . . normal working
conditions,” to make tests realistic.221 In litigation courts have enforced that
requirement.222 The law also permits the agency to conduct “announced and
unannounced on-site proficiency testing of such individuals.”223
Today, proficiency testing must be done across a wide range of clinical
laboratory specialties, including not only cytology but also specialties ranging
from bacteriology, to routine chemistry, toxicology, and virology.224 The
proficiency tests must be conducted with “the laboratory’s regular patient

215 See Laboratory Registry, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/
Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Laboratory_Registry.html [https://perma.cc/N45Q-PMAM].
216 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2012) (setting certification standards for all clinical laboratories, defined
as “a facility for the biological, microbiological, serological, chemical, immuno-hematological,
hematological, biophysical, cytological, pathological, or other examination of materials derived from
the human body for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment
of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings”).
217 See, e.g., Walt Bogdanich, Lax Laboratories: The Pap Test Misses Much Cervical Cancer Through
Labs’ Errors, WALL STREET J., Nov. 2, 1987, at A1 (noting that the Pap-screening industry “often
ignores what few laws exist to protect women from slipshod testing”).
218 Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497,
1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
219 H.R. REP. NO. 100-899, at 11 (1988), reprinted in U.S.S.C.A.N. at 3831; S. REP. NO. 100-561,
at 3-4 (1988).
220 42 C.F.R. § 493.5(c) (2016).
221 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(4)(B)(iv) (2012).
222 Consumer Fed’n of Am., 83 F.3d at 1500 (noting that CLIA requires proficiency testing to
reflect “normal working conditions”).
223 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(4)(B)(iv) (2012).
224 42 C.F.R. § 493.911-937 (2016).
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workload” and use “the laboratory’s routine methods.”225 Labs may not
communicate with other labs about tests, and they must carefully document
each step in the testing process.226 Any organization that seeks to prepare
proficiency tests for labs must have its proficiency test evaluated and
approved in advance by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS).227 The proficiency tests, however, are not blind. They may be
conducted by a supervisor in a lab, and the regulations impose detailed rules
for the design and scoring of particular types of proficiency tests.228 In the
area of cytology, individuals who do not receive scores of at least 90 percent
must be retested, and if they fail a second test they must receive remedial
training and have all of their case work reexamined; if they fail a third test,
they may not resume work absent remedial training and retesting.229
The CLIA and accompanying regulations do much more to monitor
quality at the labs beyond the proficiency testing. They also impose detailed
requirements on qualifications of personnel, and on casework in labs,
including that potential false negatives (i.e., results finding no anomalies)
must be routinely retested to double check the results.230 All labs must permit
random samples to be validated through inspections, and the federal agency
can monitor and supervise on-site any labs not found to be fully compliant.231
One early challenge to proficiency rules under the CLIA, by public interest
groups Consumer Federation of America (“Consumer Federation”) and Public
Citizen, argued that the regulations adopted by the Department of Health and
Human Services, among other things, did not regulate proficiency of cytology
labs stringently enough.232 The regulations tested cytologists by asking them
to examine five slides per hour, and not the typical 12.5 slides per hour, and
that the test could include a “much higher proportion of abnormal slides than
would occur in the average work day.”233 The agency explained only that its

225
226
227
228

42 C.F.R. § 493.801(b)(1) (2016).
42 C.F.R. § 493.801(b) (2016).
42 C.F.R. § 493.901 (2016).
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 493.945 (2016) (discussing the requirements for proficiency testing
for gynecologic examinations).
229 42 C.F.R. § 493.855 (2016).
230 See 42 USC § 263a(f)(4)(B)(iii)–(iv) (2012) (requiring various rescreening protocols—including
“random rescreening of cytology specimens determined to be in the benign category”—and “periodic
confirmation and evaluation of the proficiency of individuals involved in screening or interpreting
cytological preparations”).
231 See 42 C.F.R. § 493.61(b)(4) (2016) (requiring accredited laboratories to “[p]ermit random
sample validation and complaint inspections”); 42 C.F.R. § 493.563(a) (2016) (“[A] CMS agent may
conduct an inspection of an accredited laboratory . . . in response to a substantial allegation of
noncompliance.”). See also 42 C.F.R § 493.1274(c) (2016).
232 Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
233 Id. at 1500.
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program was based on one used in the state of Maryland.234 The D.C. Circuit
ruled the agency must “articulate a convincing rationale” or engage in
rulemaking to create a new proficiency testing protocol.235 The agency
subsequently withdrew the proposed rule, supplemented the record, sought
input from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and ultimately
concluded that a supervised, time-limited proficiency test should be conducted
with slightly different conditions than regular working conditions.236 This
type of review under the Administrative Procedure Act, provides a far more
sensible approach to adopting, reviewing, and regulating proficiency than
purely voluntary accreditation.237
234 Id. at 1506 (quoting the agency as stating that its testing rate and scoring system was
“modell[ed] . . . after that in use in the State of Maryland”).
235 Id. at 1507 (“[W]e remand to the agency to articulate a convincing rationale for its protocol
or to continue the rulemaking process it has already commenced for issuing a new one.”).
236 See CLIA Program; Cytology Proficiency Testing, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,510-02 (Mar. 17, 2000)
(announcing the withdrawal of the “proposed rule on cytology proficiency testing” at issue in
Consumer Federation of America, reaffirming the belief that said “regulations are appropriate,” and
“supplying a supplementary statement that further explains the rationale” to that effect).
237 The CLIA itself, as opposed to the ensuing regulations, has not been the subject of much
litigation. Federal district courts held that the CLIA did not create a private cause of action for
individuals to sue laboratories that do not comply with its provisions. See, e.g., Whitehead v.
Edmondson, No. 1:97CV29-S-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23347, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 1998)
(“[T]he court finds that . . . CLIA does not provide a private right of action to individuals . . . . ”);
Jewell v. Pinson, No. 255661, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 2152, at *18 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2005)
(“[W]e are persuaded that the language of the CLIA does not create a private cause of action.”);
Wood v. Schuen, 760 N.E.2d 651, 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[B]ecause a laboratory director does
not incur personal liability for a private negligence action based upon alleged CLIA violations, the
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Schuen.”). For a ruling denying a
motion to dismiss on a federal False Claims Act case premised on CLIA violations, see United States
ex rel. Porter v. HCA Health Servs. of Okla., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-0992, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115853,
at *15 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011). For cases using a CLIA violation as part of a negligence or
malpractice case, see McClung v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 2:06-0336, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 102611, at *26 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 1, 2007) and Wilkerson v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., No.
5114, 2005 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 407, at *11-12 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. 2005). One also sees CLIA
issues litigated in cases by former employees that allege they were fired in retaliation for
whistleblowing regarding CLIA violations that if reported can result in revocation of the
laboratories’ certification, or litigation by employees fired for violating CLIA rules. See, e.g., Zeigler
v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 877 F. Supp. 2d 454, 464 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (“Plaintiffs respond that the
issue is . . . whether plaintiffs’ reporting ‘of what may have been criminally illegal conduct’ was a
motivating factor in the decision to terminate their employment.”); Falk v. Phillips, No.
4:06CV00506, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93883, at *10-11 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 20, 2007) (“[The plaintiff]
alleges defendants terminated him in retaliation for speaking with the surveyor from CLIA.”). See
also Roberts v. St. Agnes Hosp., No. GJH-13-3475, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82400, at *2, *22 (D. Md.
June 25, 2015) (adjudicating a race-discrimination and retaliation case regarding the termination of
a hospital lab technician whose job performance “jeopardized the Hospital’s [CLIA] accreditation”).
In one case, a state laboratory inspector was fired after federal inspectors uncovered a lack of
recordkeeping. Wynn v. State Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Dep’t of Health), No. 475 C.D. 2013, 2013 Pa.
Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 785, at *1-4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 25, 2013). In addition, laboratories have
challenged the suspension of their certificates for violating the CLIA, including for checking their
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B. Regulating the Quality of Proficiency Testing
A comprehensive regulatory scheme like the CLIA can best ensure a
consistent and monitored framework for proficiency testing across
laboratories and disciplines. In short, we need something like the CLIA across
the wide range of disciplines that produce expert evidence for litigation.
Improved judicial review of proferred experts, as we recommended in Part II,
might also incentivize such regulation.
Proficiency testing cannot assure reliability of a particular expert or of a field
of expertise if it is not conducted in a manner designed to mimic real-world
conditions and carefully test the accuracy of the expert’s work. Proficiency
testing should be independent and blind. The tests should be calibrated at
realistic levels of difficulty by a national scientific body. The American Bar
Association’s Resolution on Forensic Science states that all crime labs should be
required to “conduct proficiency testing using blind tests prepared internally or
externally and submitted as normal casework evidence or by re-examination by
another examiner on completed casework.”238 More recently, the White House’s
PCAST report recommended that “proficiency testing needs to be improved by
making it more rigorous, by incorporating it systematically within the flow of
casework, and by disclosing tests for evaluation by the scientific community.”239
Unfortunately, in few laboratories or fields in which evidence is produced for
litigation are such recommendations adopted.
Scientific research is being done to develop measures of the difficulty of
latent fingerprints, and when this research is completed, then proficiency
tests could be set at objectively-defined difficulty levels (which would better
permit use of signal detection theory to assess how well the experts can
discriminate between signals and noise).240 Such an approach should be taken
across forensic disciplines.
Conducting blind proficiency testing can pose practical challenges given
the current workflow of most crime laboratories and their close relationships
with law enforcement. Sample evidence must be designed so that it can be
realistically incorporated into the casework in a laboratory and so that the
experts do not realize that it is a test. If lab analysts frequently contact law
enforcement to obtain further information about cases, then they might
realize that the sample case is a test. To minimize cognitive bias, however,
answers with another laboratory’s equipment, or for operating a laboratory and not obtaining CLIA
certification. E.g. Wade Pediatrics v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 567 F.3d 1202, 1203 (10th Cir.
2009) (denying a petition by a testing facility whose CLIA certificate was suspended for one year);
Anghel v. Daines, 927 N.Y.S. 2d 710, 715-16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (discussing petitioner’s negligence in
failing to obtain a CLIA certificate).
238 See Resolution 111B, A.B.A. SEC. OF CRIM. JUST. REP. 8 (2004).
239 PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 10.
240 Id.
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such contacts should be eliminated (i.e., analysts should be blind to police
beliefs about sources to avoid contamination of the analysis). A lab that
conducts blinded analysis can far more readily engage in blind proficiency
testing. Only a few U.S. labs, like the Houston Forensic Science Center,241
have implemented routine blind forensic testing.
A government agency could take on a role in regulating proficiency
testing, just as under the CLIA. Of course, scholars for years have called for
greater independence of crime laboratories from law enforcement.242 Few
crime laboratories are independent, although more now have scientific
oversight. Whether independent or not, they can be regulated by an
independent scientific entity. The National Academy of Sciences and many
scientists and academics have called for the creation of a National Institute of
Forensic Science (NIFS), along the lines of the National Institute of Health
(NIH) to comprehensively regulate forensic science.243 This was one of many
proposals in the lengthy 2009 NAS Report, but the committee called NIFS
“the greatest hope for success in [reform],” and noted that all of the
“remaining recommendations . . . are crucially tied to the creation of
NIFS.”244 The proposal to create a NIFS was applauded by many academics
and some in the forensic science community.245 The NIFS proposal was
opposed by law enforcement and some in the forensic science community,
and it has not been adopted, although legislation continues to be introduced
that would create such an agency or otherwise fund federal regulatory efforts
in the area.246 Members of Congress soon focused on the National Institute
241 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
242 See, e.g., M. A. Thompson, Bias and Quality Control in Forensic Science: A Cause for Concern,
19 J. FORENSIC SCI. 504, 512 (1974) (proposing that laboratories be controlled by the judicial branch,

rather than by the police); see also Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases:
The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 478 (1997) (“Independent
crime labs should be established as part of an augmented Medical Examiner system.”).
243 NAS Report, supra note 25, at 19-20.
244 Id. at 20.
245 See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement
Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 53-54 (investigating the dangers of allowing law
enforcement agencies to conduct forensic investigations and arguing for an independent forensic
science academy); see also Quintin Chatman, How Scientific Is Forensic Science?, CHAMPION, Aug.
2009, at 36, 37-38 (discussing existing problems with forensic investigation and arguing that the NIFS
could help rectify them); National Research Council’s Publication “Strengthening Forensic Science in the
United States: A Path Forward”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
111th Cong. 32 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing May 2009] (statement of Peter Neufeld, Co-Director, The
Innocence Project) (arguing for a strong centralized authority in the forensic sciences to control
quality and encourage best practices).
246 See, e.g. Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2016, S. 3259, 114th Cong. § 4 (2016),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/3259/text/is?format=txt [https://perma.cc/9U4NM2FX] (proposing the foundation of a National Forensic Science Research Initiative to “improve, expand,
and coordinate Federal research in the forensic sciences”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. 2022: FORENSIC
SCIENCE AND STANDARDS (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2022/summary

956

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 901

of Standards and Technology (NIST),247 and NIST has convened a group of
committees composed of scientists, lawyers, and judges, to consider
improvements to forensic disciplines and standards.248 The Department of
Justice created a National Commission on Forensic Science in 2013 to review
standards for forensics, but it was disbanded in early 2017.249 An entire federal
agency need not be created to regulate and improve proficiency testing.
Instead, federal grants could be conditioned on compliance with proficiency
rules, such as with CLIA. A statute could alternatively require that as a
condition for use of federal forensic databanks any laboratory must meet
minimum proficiency standards. An existing agency, such as NIST, could
certify compliance with regulations.
Unless and until such a comprehensive framework exists, individual labs can
adopt proficiency testing and encourage the use of such testing as a matter of best
practices, but such a model would not ensure consistent and high-quality
proficiency testing.250 While not perfect, in part because it does not insist on blind
testing, CLIA contains comprehensive regulation of quality control at clinical
laboratories. It requires setting out in advance the range of tasks at laboratories
and their complexity, with testing designed to assess proficiency at each task.251
The consequences of failed proficiency tests are also set out in advance: retesting,
reexamination of the person’s casework, and remedial training, and if that does not
[https://perma.cc/WQ6R-DS3D] (proposing quality control standards for forensic science); Criminal Justice
and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 112th Cong. § 101 (2011) (proposing the establishment of an
office and board of forensic science). Crime lab directors made strong statements in support of the NIFS
proposal. Hearing May 2009, supra note 245, at 16 (statement of Peter M. Marone) (advocating for increased
funding for the forensic sciences). But see id. at 25-26 (statement of Dean Gialamas, President, and Beth
Greene, President-Elect, American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors).
247 Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: The Role of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation of the H. Comm. on Science
and Technology, 111th Cong. 3-4 (2009) (introducing the problems plaguing forensic science and how
the establishment of the NIFS could help); see also D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on
Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 225, 238 (discussing the
extensive hearings on forensic science conducted before Congress).
248 Forensic Science Standards Effort Takes Shape as NIST Appoints Scientific Area Committees
Members, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.nist.gov/forensics/sacmembers-announcement.cfm [https://perma.cc/C2N7-V5W9] (discussing the various appointments
made by the NIST).
249 Department of Justice and National Institute of Standards and Technology Announce Launch of
National Commission on Forensic Science, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Feb. 15, 2013),
https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2013/02/department-justice-and-national-institutestandards-and-technology-announce [https://perma.cc/8XTK-3DW9].
250 The PCAST Report asks that the FBI conduct routine blind proficiency testing in its
regular casework and that the FBI assist other labs in doing so. PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 17.
Whether the FBI will take on that role remains to be seen.
251 42 C.F.R. § 493.17 (2016). The entire proficiency testing framework is informed by experts
on a CLIA advisory committee, tasked with engaging in ongoing review of testing and standards,
including proficiency testing standards. 42 C.F.R. § 493.2001 (2016).
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work, then the person cannot do casework until further training produces
acceptable results.252 A similar framework should be adopted for all laboratory
work. Case-by-case adjudication cannot create such a framework.
C. International Approaches
Many countries do not have the resources for large crime laboratories like
those operating in the United States, and yet they have established far more
rigorous systems for evaluating proficiency in forensics. In Germany, an
organization called GEDNAP conducts proficiency testing of DNA
laboratories.253 The group was independent of the laboratories themselves,
and was founded by the German Society for Legal Medicine.254 It is run with
central involvement of research scientists; the tests are designed by a
laboratory at the University of Munster. The program has expanded to
include over 220 laboratories from 38 countries, with two tests per year,
permitting an international framework for quality control.255 The testing is
not blind for the laboratories; the participants know that they are being
tested. However, GEDNAP does review the samples blind by anonymizing
the test submissions.256
In the U.K., laboratories are required by the United Kingdom Accreditation
Service to “define the level and frequency of participation” in proficiency
testing and each laboratory must “be prepared to justify their policy and
approach” in appropriate proficiency testing.257 A lab plan for proficiency
testing must be “regularly reviewed” in response to changes in the lab.258 These

252
253

See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
See GEDNAP Stain Commission, GERMAN DNA PROFILING, http://www.gednap.org/
[https://perma.cc/UD9L-6P22] (providing information regarding the history and standards
set by GEDNAP).
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. (discussing the anonymity of the tests performed by the GEDNAP). For a detailed
description of GEDNAP, see generally Steven Rand et al., The GEDNAP (German DNA Profiling
Group) Blind Trial Concept, 116 INT. J. LEGAL MED. 199 (2002) (discussing the procedures and
standards GEDNAP uses when performing DNA analysis). Research has been done on the results
and the testing provided a set of important lessons identifying common problem areas in
laboratories, including “human carelessness” in transcription errors, as well as problems in
interpretation of DNA mixtures. S. Rand et al., The GEDNAP Blind Trial Concept Part II. Trends and
Developments, 118 INT. J. LEGAL MED. 83, 85 (2004) (discussing the developments in GEDNAP’s
blind trials that help minimize errors).
257 U.K. ACCREDITATION SERV., UKAS POLICY ON PARTICIPATION IN PROFICIENCY TESTING
4.3–4.5 (Nov. 2013), https://www.ukas.com/download/publications/Technical%20Policy%20Statements/
TPS%2047%20-%20Edition%203%20-%20November%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4QY-44ZG]
(requiring all UK laboratories to participate in proficiency testing).
258 Id. at 4.3 (requiring labs to have a plan for participating in proficiency testing that is
regularly reviewed).
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requirements are not overly detailed. However, these requirements are more
rigorous than those in the U.S., for example, adopted by the leading U.S.
organization for accrediting forensic labs, the ASCLD/LAB.
In Ontario, Canada, the Centre of Forensic Sciences (CFS) is a branch
within the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services.259
Routine proficiency tests as required by accreditation have been
supplemented by a program of blind proficiency testing managed by the CFS
Quality Assurance unit. Police and fire investigation agencies submit dummy
cases that resemble actual cases that are used to test the lab analysts.
Following the reporting of results, feedback is provided to analysts and
supervisors.260 Each of these models suggests far more can be done in the
U.S. to regulate proficiency and assure the quality of work performed by
forensic laboratories and their analysts.
CONCLUSION
In a decision eventually reversed by the Tenth Circuit, a district judge
threw out evidence of a dog’s detection of narcotics in the defendant’s luggage
because, among other reasons, the dog’s handler could present no evidence of
the dog’s proficiency at detecting drugs:
Maintenance of a dog’s reliability depends on progressive training and daily
documentation of the dog’s activities. [Defendant’s expert] emphasized that
thorough and complete daily documentation is “extremely important” and is
mandatory for proper on-going training. The handler must design the dog’s
training schedule based on perceived problems in the field, and it is very
important to document false alerts in the field because they are warning signs
to the handler that there may be problems with the dog. It is insufficient for
the handler to rely on other law enforcement officers to keep detailed records
on the dog because they will not be designing or conducting the training
sessions. If potential problem areas are unknown, training has little value
because it is not tailored to address the dog’s deficiencies and the training
exercises will have low task difficulty.261

A handler must be “constantly vigilant to make sure that the dog does not
pick up false cues.”262
259 Centre of Forensic Sciences, MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY SAFETY & CORRECTIONAL SERVS.,
http://www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/centre_forensic/CFS_intro.html [https://perma.cc/H6M8-YHZ8]
(providing information about the Centre of Forensic Sciences).
260 Email from Jonathan Newman, Deputy Director, Center of Forensic Sciences, to Brandon
Garrett (Oct. 20, 2016) (on file with author).
261 United States v. Kennedy, 955 F. Supp 1331, 1335 (D.N.M. 1996).
262 Id.
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What is true for dogs is true all the more for human experts, who are
susceptible to all sorts of misleading cues when retained to assist a party in a
case.263 No technique is immune from error, and for any technique proficiency
is relevant. To continue with the dog analogy, just as a dog’s pedigree does not
ensure top performance at the Westminster Kennel Club Dog Show, an expert’s
pedigree does not ensure expert performance in court. Judges have been
focused on pedigree when they should be looking at empirical evidence of
proficiency. As the White House PCAST Report put it: “[N]either experience,
nor judgment, nor good professional practices (such as certification programs
and accreditation programs, standardized protocols, proficiency testing, and
codes of ethics) can substitute for actual evidence of foundational validity and
reliability.”264 This is not to say that credentials and experience do not matter;
they may be correlated with performance. Or they may not be. One cannot
know whether an individual’s performance is up to par without evaluating it.
A wide range of disciplines involve some degree of subjective analysis, and
for these forms of expertise, performance data is particularly critical. Where an
expert’s conclusions are formed through steps that are not objectively set out, but
rather require some degree of subjective judgment, the expert is a “black box.”
For these experts, the only way to know how reliable their method is involves
proficiency testing.265 If jurors do not hear that individual experts have known
error rates, they may assume the experts are infallible. No expert is infallible.
Before qualifying a person as an expert, judges should open up the black
box: judges should directly pose the question whether the person can perform
the task accurately and reliably. If the expert cannot demonstrate proficiency,
then the expert should not be qualified. Once the expert demonstrates
proficiency adequate to be deemed an expert, then the proficiency data can
be used to inform the factfinder’s assessment of the weight to be given to the
expert’s testimony. Within a judicial regime that requires proof of proficiency,
proficiency testing will follow. But the courts should go further and insist on
rigorous proficiency testing. Only by demanding data from realistic blind
proficiency testing will courts ensure that parties and their experts come
forward with the data needed to ensure that an expert truly is an expert. In
mandating this information, judges will greatly simplify the question of
expert admissibility, avoiding the more complex methodological inquiries
called for by Rule 702 and Daubert.

263 See generally Itiel E. Dror, A Hierarchy of Expert Performance, 5 J. APPLIED RES. IN MEMORY
& COGNITION 121 (2016) (discussing the susceptibility of experts to bias and using certain criteria
to build a hierarchy of expert performance that assesses the reliability of their conclusions).
264 PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 6.
265 Id. at 5-6 (discussing the subjectivity of certain forensic tests and comparisons conducted by experts).
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If courts continue to be indifferent to the problem of proficiency, then
comprehensive regulation of forensic proficiency, along the lines of the
regulations for clinical laboratories, can ensure that forensic laboratories
produce the data. Once the data exists, courts will be far more likely to admit
the data as relevant to weight. A consistent regulatory approach would also
greatly advance our understanding of the reliability of expert evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 should be interpreted to require proof that a
putative expert is proficient at applying proper tools to proper data to produce
correct answers. Experts with unknown proficiency should no more be
admitted than evidence of unknown provenance. The judiciary should make
empirical evidence of proficiency the touchstone for expert qualification.

